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Our modern world is filled with a dizzying number of copyrights.1 The 
texts, tweets, and selfies created each day are automatically copyrighted, as are 
home movies, diary entries, and Play-doh® sculptures. All original works of au-
thorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression are protected for seventy 
*  Associate Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law. Ph.D., University of 
Florida, College of Journalism and Communications, 2004; J.D., University of 
Florida, Levin College of Law, 2004; M.A., Florida State University, Speech 
Communication, 1999; B.A., Florida State University, Communication and 
Philosophy, 1998. Participants at the 2015 Works-in-Progress Intellectual Property 
Colloquium (WIPIP) provided valuable insights for which I am grateful. And 
special thanks to Victoria Pasculli, Elizabeth Willis, and the other thoughtful 
editors of the Yale Law & Policy Review.  
 1. See Dotan Oliar et al., Copyright Registrations: Who, What, When, Where, and Why, 
92 TEX. L. REV. 2211, 2240 (2014) (“Every day, millions of emails, tweets, and 
messages are sent; blog posts and online articles are posted; still photos and videos 
are taken with cameras and cellphones; the vast majority of all of these are likely 
copyright protected. Yet, the vast majority of these are not registered, be it because 
many are not created for profit, or because the cost and trouble of registration 
outweighs the creator’s expected benefit.”). 
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years after the author’s death.2 This protection attaches automatically whether 
or not the author knows it or wants it.3 And this protection not only includes 
verbatim copying but also adaptations. The dimensions of copyright protection 
have incrementally expanded since our first Copyright Act in 1790. One won-
ders if today we have too many copyrighted works and too much copyright pro-
tection. 
Copyright offers a limited exclusive right in response to the market failure 
of public goods. Without a way to protect the investment in nonexcludable, 
nonrivalrous products, authors and inventors might not create.4 The classic in-
centive theory posits that limited term, exclusive rights—and the corresponding 
supracompetitive prices—are tolerated, as a way to encourage the creation of 
new works.5 Authors are therefore granted exclusive rights as a way to promote 
socially beneficial goods.6 But if these exclusive rights are not calibrated correct-
ly, they can impose more costs than public benefits.7 In other words, copyright 
can end up suppressing more communicative activity than it encourages.8 
 2. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012). For works made for hire and for anonymous or 
pseudonymous works, the duration of copyright is ninety-five years from first 
publication or 120 years from creation, whichever is shorter. Id. § 302(c).  
 3. Id. § 102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in 
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . from 
which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either 
directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”). 
 4. See Wendy J. Gordon, Authors, Publishers, and Public Goods: Trading Gold for 
Dross, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 159, 164 (2002) (“A ‘public good’ is a good that can be 
shared non-rivalrously by many, and from whose use non-payors are not easily 
physically excluded. Goods with these characteristics are susceptible to free riding, 
and thus difficult to produce in a normal competitive market. Inventions and 
works of authorship are ‘public goods’ whose creation is stimulated by the limited 
private exclusion rights known as patent and copyright. Lighthouses and public 
defense are ‘public goods’ for which governments usually provide direct 
support.”). 
 5. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual 
Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 131 (2004). 
 6. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985) 
(“The rights conferred by copyright are designed to assure contributors to the 
store of knowledge a fair return for their labors.”); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (“The monopoly privileges that 
Congress may authorize are . . . a means by which an important public purpose 
may be achieved.”); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic 
philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and 
copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal 
gain is the best way to advance public welfare.”). 
 7. See Wendy J. Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure and Prisoner’s Dilemma in 
Intellectual Property, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 853, 858 (1992). 
 8. See Gordon, supra note 4, at 167.  
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Copyright has historically been a limited right.9 Yet today these limits have 
expanded to an unprecedented scope. The concern with rights accretion is that 
as more creative works are within the private domain, fewer are in the public 
domain from which others can draw for new creative expressions.10 New works 
build upon prior works, yet there are fewer building blocks for new creations. 
One way to check and re-balance the interests of copyright holders and us-
ers is with formalities. For nearly two centuries, U.S. copyright law relied on 
statutory formalities to balance the public interest with the interests of copy-
right holders.11 These formalities historically included affixing a copyright no-
tice on the work and filing a registration with the government. Today no for-
malities are necessary for an original work of authorship to secure protection 
for seventy years after the author’s death. Copyright attaches automatically. 
This watershed change was spurred by a desire to harmonize U.S. copyright law 
with the laws of other developed nations.12 Our obligations under international 
treaties require that copyright attach automatically and without constitutive 
formalities.13 But accepting the proposition that copyright now attaches at the 
moment of fixation in a tangible medium of expression does not necessarily 
lead to the conclusion that a copyright holder should be relieved of all responsi-
bility to publicly claim her work.14 Copyright protection gives an author an ex-
 9. As detailed in Part II, historically copyright has been limited in duration and 
scope. The U.S. Constitution prescribes that copyright protection be for “limited 
Times.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. And the first copyright, in 1790, was for a 
renewable, fourteen-year term and applied only to maps, books, and charts. Act of 
May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (1790).  
 10. See Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property 
Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 13-16 (2004). 
 11. See Daniel Gervais & Dashiell Renaud, The Future of United States Copyright 
Formalities: Why We Should Prioritize Recordation, and How To Do It, 28 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1459, 1460-62 (2013); see also Catherine Seville, Copyright’s Bargain: 
Defining Our Terms, 3 INTELL. PROP. Q. 312, 312 (2003) (noting that legislatures 
around the world have “struggled to reconcile the needs of all those whom 
copyright law is intended to serve”).  
 12. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 264-65 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
1976 Act thoroughly revised copyright law and enabled the United States to join 
the Berne Convention . . . .”). 
 13. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Artistic and Literary Works, Sept. 9, 
1886, as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971, and amended in 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 
99-27 (1886) [hereinafter Berne Convention]. 
 14. Cf. Gervais & Renaud, supra note 11, at 1470 (“The United States’ adherence to 
Berne marks an apparent acceptance of the principle that copyright should vest 
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clusive right in the work,15 in essence a monopoly right, in exchange for pro-
moting the progress of science and learning.16 This instrumental view of copy-
right sees the limited monopoly right as a means to encourage original works of 
authorship.17 As the Supreme Court has emphasized, “the Framers intended 
copyright itself to be the engine of free expression.”18 
Public claiming has been part of the bargained-for exchange with the pub-
lic.19 The balance of copyright’s quid pro quo is fundamentally upset when a 
copyright holder is relieved of all obligations to claim an interest in her work. 
The monopoly is now given indiscriminately to all original works. Exclusive 
rights are now given to holders that may neither know nor want the protection. 
Rather than creating simple and easy formalities, we abandoned formalities al-
together. We should certainly not return to the cumbersome registration and 
protectionist manufacturing clause formalities of the past.20 But that does not 
mean we cannot construct a reasonable system that balances the interests of au-
thors and content users. 
Historically, a copyright holder had to claim. And today there is no doctri-
nal reason to exempt copyright from claiming. I offer a modest proposal that 
seeks to balance these interests: a copyright holder should have to claim an in-
terest in her work, and if she doesn’t, users of the work should be able to rely on 
an innocent infringer defense when facing a claim for infringement. 
To explore more fully the proposition that a copyright holder should have 
to claim an interest in her work, this Article progresses in four parts. Part I ex-
 15. The modern copyright holder has six statutory rights, including the exclusive right 
to make copies, prepare derivatives, publicly distribute, publicly perform, and 
publicly display the work. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(6) (2012).  
 16. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33-34 (2003) 
(“The rights of a patentee or copyright holder are part of a ‘carefully crafted 
bargain,’ under which, once the patent or copyright monopoly has expired, the 
public may use the invention or work at will and without attribution.”) (internal 
citation omitted). 
 17. See Thomas F. Cotter, Memes and Copyright, 80 TUL. L. REV. 331, 332 (2005) (“On 
this [instrumental] view, copyright promotes the progress of ‘science’ by 
encouraging authors (and publishers) to create (and publish) works of authorship, 
at a greater rate or lower social cost than would be the case in the absence of a 
copyright system.”). 
 18. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985); see also 
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (“[T]he Framers intended copyright 
itself to be the engine of free expression. By establishing a marketable right to the 
use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and 
disseminate ideas.”). 
 19. Cf. Jeffrey L. Harrison, Copyright As Contract, 22 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 279, 281 (2015) 
(“Copyright is essentially a contract between the author and the public with the 
government acting as the agent of the public.”). 
 20. See infra notes 77-82 and accompanying text. 
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plores the foundations and reasons for public claiming of the intangible copy-
right. Part II traces the history of formalities in the United States. Part III out-
lines the problems that have arisen because we no longer require claiming. And 
Part IV contextualizes and discusses my proposal to incentivize copyright hold-
ers to claim their works and to reinvigorate the innocent infringer defense. 
 
I. Why Claim 
 
Claiming serves important functions to signal ownership interests, filter out 
undeserving and commercially dead works, and facilitate licensing of commer-
cially valuable works. Notice and registration signal an ownership claim to the 
world.21 Ownership means that certain protections apply and that an owner ex-
ists to enforce those protections.22 Ownership of property interests comes with 
the right to exclude.23 An exclusive right empowers an interest holder to prevent 
others from copying and using a work. 
Public claiming of an ownership interest is particularly important for in-
tangible resources.24 Protection of copyright, like other forms of “property,” is 
not absolute and should be tailored to balance the benefits and burdens of pro-
tection.25 Copyright should be cabined by its purpose, and copyright should 
balance public and private interests.26 Without someone claiming the intangible 
copyright, it can be exceedingly difficult to identify its owner. Without an iden-
tifiable owner to benefit from the monopoly, copyright protection is a net social 
loss.27 
The long-term purpose of copyright is to create a public benefit. This pur-
pose is achieved by according short-term monopoly benefits to the copyright 
holder.28 But without an owner to claim short-term monopoly benefits, the ex-
 21. Gervais & Renaud, supra note 11, at 1460-61. 
 22. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, Does It Matter Whether Intellectual Property is 
Property?, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 715 (1993); Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual 
Property is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 108 (1990). 
 23. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730 
(1998). 
 24. See Peter S. Menell & Michael J. Meurer, Notice Failure and Notice Externalities, 5 J. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 2 (2013). 
 25. See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 
503, 510 (1945). 
 26. See id. at 506.  
 27. See Promoting the Use of Orphan Works: Balancing the Interest of Copyright Owners 
and Users: Hearing before the Subcomm. on the Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual 
Property of H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 19-20 (2008) (statement of 
Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights). 
 28. See Paul J. Heald, Reviving the Rhetoric of the Public Interest: Choir Directors, Copy 
Machines, and New Arrangements of Public Domain Music, 46 DUKE L.J. 241, 247 
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clusive rights of the monopoly create a burden on users without a correspond-
ing benefit to an owner. Excluding the public from works that do not have an 
identifiable owner is inefficient, wasteful, and creates deadweight losses.29 Inad-
equate claiming thus raises the social costs of offering copyright protection.30 
Public claiming would ameliorate the difficulty in identifying a copyright 
holder. Claiming signals the identity of the owner to the world and that en-
forceable restrictions apply. As Professor James Gibson has noted, “the familiar 
c-in-a-circle, followed by the year of publication and the name of the copyright 
owner, served to inform the public that it was dealing with something laden 
with legal restrictions, that there were certain things it could and could not do 
with the work.”31 The Constitution prescribes that copyright protection is only 
for “limited Times,” and claiming historically signaled whether the temporary 
protection had yet expired.32 Public claiming helps distinguish between works 
for which you need permission and works that you are freely able to use. 
Formalities historically have balanced public and private interests, but to-
day, copyright is radically unbalanced in favor of private interests.33 To exercise 
the statutory monopoly, a copyright holder historically had to claim her work.34 
The original purpose of formalities, as copyright scholar William Patry has not-
ed, was two-fold: “(1) require those interested in obtaining copyright protection 
to take affirmative steps and (2) create a public record so that those wishing to 
use the work might be put on notice of the author or proprietor’s claim.”35 At 
the inception of federal copyright protection in the late 1800s, only a small frac-
(1996) (“[The Framers of the Constitution] knew that the grant of exclusive rights 
would be a cost borne directly by the public, and they demanded a direct public 
benefit in return.”). 
 29. See Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 
1209 (1996) (“Copyright creates the deadweight social loss associated with 
monopoly power over distribution of already-created works, it increases the cost 
of creating new works by making it costly to avoid infringing existing copyrights, 
and it requires an enforcement mechanism.”). 
 30. See Menell & Meurer, supra note 24, at 10-11 (identifying four types of costs on 
other resource developers cause by inadequate resource notice). 
 31. James Gibson, Once and Future Copyright, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 207 (2005). 
 32. See infra notes 59-98 and accompanying text. 
 33. See Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 487, 
490 (2004). 
 34. See Bernard R. Sorkin, The Futility of a Future Without Formalities, 13 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 589, 591 (1995) (“The historic conception of copyright in this 
country, as a legal monopoly, seems to require that some assertion be made by 
those who wish to benefit from the monopoly.”). 
 35. 3 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 6:19 (2015). 
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tion of published works were registered, which meant the majority of works en-
tered the public domain, and these works were available for all to use.36 
Copyright is intended to balance users’ interests in access to works with au-
thors’ interests in compensation for use of their works.37 Copyright should bal-
ance supply-side incentives against demand-side realities. In other words, the ex 
ante incentives for creating works should be balanced against the public’s need 
to use works.38 Historically, formalities helped maintain this balance. Today, a 
simple notice provision coupled with an efficient registration procedure would 
be a reasonable way to balance the public’s interest with the author’s interest. 
In addition to signaling an ownership interest, public claiming would help 
ensure that we are protecting the right types of works; otherwise, there is a 
chilling effect on free expression and deadweight losses on social creativity.39 
Formalities signal that a work is being claimed as valuable and help filter out 
those works that are not commercially valuable.40 If an author is so unmoved by 
copyright that she is not willing to put minimal notice information on a work, 
why should the public be required to shoulder the cost of the monopoly?41 
There are costs for locking up materials with copyright protection. But there are 
also costs associated with requiring an author to publicly claim her work. Public 
claiming is either a cost on the author to comply with the formality, or it is a 
deadweight cost on society when notice is missing. In light of the broad protec-
tion offered by copyright today, notice failure externalities should be borne by 
 36. 1 id. § 1:19 (“Records assembled by the Library of Congress indicate that more than 
15,000 works were published in the United States between 1790 and 1800, but that 
only 779 copyright registrations were made in this same period.”). See also 
Lawrence Lessig, Copyright’s First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1057, 1063 (2001) 
(explaining that “tiny regulation of a tiny proportion of the extraordinary range of 
creative work in 1790 has morphed into this massive regulation of everyone who 
has any connection to the most trivial of creative authorship”). 
 37. Pamela Samuelson et al., The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for Reform, 25 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175, 1176 (2010). 
 38. See Robert Spoo, Ezra Pound’s Copyright Statute: Perpetual Rights and the Problem 
of Heirs, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1775, 1795 (2009); see also Lemley, supra note 5. 
 39. See Sprigman, supra note 33, at 489-90.  
 40. Pamela Samuelson, Legally Speaking: Too Many Copyrights?, 54 COMM. ACM 29, 31 
(2011) (“If too many works are in-copyright for too long, then our culture suffers 
and we also lose the ability to distinguish in a meaningful way between those 
works that need copyright protection and those that don’t.”). 
 41. Dotan Oliar & Nicholas Matich, Copyright Preregistration: Evidence and Lessons 
from the First Seven Years, 2005-2012, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 1073, 1121 (2013) (“An author’s 
failure to comply with a formality—which in the case of notice is as innocuous as 
adding the copyright symbol, ©, together with the author’s name and the date to 
the work—suggests that no copyright incentive was needed to induce its creation. 
If so, it makes no sense for society to bear the limitations that copyright protection 
puts on the work’s copying and distribution.”). 
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the copyright holder, rather than by the public. The copyright holder receives 
more copyright protection today. In exchange, a copyright holder should have 
to claim her work at a minimum. 
Notice and registration can facilitate finding the copyright holder, from 
whom permission can be negotiated. But notice failure increases the transaction 
costs to license a work.42 Efficient licensing of protected works depends on be-
ing able to identify and locate the appropriate rights holder. Claiming would 
help reduce the high transaction costs of license-seekers identifying and con-
tacting rights holders. Public claiming would also give clarity and comfort to 
potential users of the works. The difficulty in identifying a copyright holder has 
created “orphan works,” which are works essentially held hostage by copyright 
protections.43 
In a nutshell, the orphan works problem is this: today nearly all works are 
protected by copyright. To use a protected work, a user typically needs permis-
sion, to “either ensure peace of mind, avoid unpredictability, or, more likely, to 
avoid exposure to liability,” as the Copyright Office noted.44 A user cannot get 
permission if she cannot find the copyright holder.45 And without permission, 
users do not risk using the works.46 This decision to forgo using the work is not 
in the public interest. For example, libraries and museums have substantial por-
 42. David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 B.C. L. REV. 139, 156 (2009) 
(“[I]n a culture where the stakes of infringement are enormous, potential users 
must spend enormous amounts of time and money trying to track down the 
owners of such works and make sure they have cleared the rights to them.”). 
 43. See Lydia Pallas Loren, Abandoning the Orphans: An Open Access Approach to 
Hostage Works, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1431, 1434 (2012) (“I conclude that these 
works should not be viewed as ‘orphans,’ but rather as ‘hostages’—constrained in 
their movement by the restricting combination of copyright law and the absence 
of copyright owners who could release works from their confinement.”). 
 44. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS 
DIGITIZATION 41 (2015) [hereinafter ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION], 
http://copyright.gov/orphan/reports/orphan-works2015.pdf. The Copyright Office 
has emphasized that the “the orphan works problem is widespread and 
significant” because “anyone using an orphan work does so under a legal cloud, as 
there is always the possibility that the copyright owner could emerge after the use 
has commenced and seek substantial infringement damages, an injunction, and/or 
attorneys’ fees.” Id. at 2. 
 45. Id. at 35. 
 46. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS 15 
(2006) [hereinafter 2006 REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS], http://www.copyright.gov/ 
orphan/orphan-report.pdf (“Many users of copyrighted works who have limited 
resources or are particularly risk-averse have indicated that the risk of liability for 
copyright infringement, however remote, is enough to prompt them simply to not 
make use of the work.”). 
432 
 
Reid FINAL COPY.docx (Do Not Delete) 7/7/2016 3:29 PM 
CLAIMING THE COPYRIGHT  
tions of their collections that do not have an identifiable owner.47 The preserva-
tion and dissemination of these materials is often thwarted by copyright. This 
decision to forgo using copyrighted works in ways that would contribute to ed-
ucation, culture, and research creates deadweight loss. 
The public has legitimate interests in using others’ works. Libraries, muse-
ums, archives, and universities often have large collections of donated materials 
for which authorship is unknown.48 These collections include photographs, un-
published manuscripts and letters, and works of fine art and visual art. Scholars, 
documentary filmmakers, publishers, and private citizens have legitimate inter-
ests in accessing these works.49 Yet the Register of Copyrights observed: “when 
confronted by the absence of clear information about the work’s owner, most 
users simply do not use the work.”50 The risks are too high. As the Register of 
Copyrights noted, “[c]urrently, anyone using an orphan work runs the risk that 
the copyright owner may step forward and bring an infringement action for 
substantial damages, attorneys’ fees, and/or injunctive relief unless a specific ex-
ception or limitation to copyright applies.”51 Today museums and libraries have 
millions of pages of archival documents, photographs, oral histories, and reels 
of film that they cannot publish or digitize because the authorship is uncer-
tain.52 
These works are essentially held captive by the automatic copyright afford-
ed to these works. Without permission from unknown copyright holders, these 
 47. See, e.g., Response by the J. Paul Getty Trust et al. to the Notice of Inquiry 
Concerning Orphan Works and Mass Digitization (Feb. 4, 2013), 
http://copyright.gov/orphan/comments/noi_10222012/Museums.pdf; Response by 
the Cornell University Library to the Notice of Inquiry Concerning Orphan 
Works, Comment OW0569, at 1-2 (Mar. 23, 2005), http://copyright.gov/orphan/ 
comments/OW0569-Thomas.pdf. This problem is not unique to the United States. 
See NAT’L MUSEUM DIRS. COUNCIL, ORPHAN WORKS AND VOLUNTARY EXTENDED 
COLLECTIVE LICENSING: IMPACT ON UK MUSEUMS (2012), http://www 
.nationalmuseums.org.uk/media/documents/images/nmdc_err_briefing_on_orph
an_works_and_vol_ecl.pdf; AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM’N, COPYRIGHT AND THE 
DIGITAL ECONOMY 290-91, http://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/files/pdfs/ 
publications/13.orphan_works.pdf.  
 48. 2006 REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 46, at 37. 
 49. The “Orphan Works” Problem and Proposed Legislation Before the H. Subcomm. on 
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th 
Cong. (2008) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights). 
 50. 2006 REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 46, at 26. 
 51. ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION, supra note 44, at 34-35.  
 52. Marybeth Peters, The Importance of Orphan Works Legislation, U.S. COPYRIGHT 
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works cannot be used or preserved.53 The orphan works problem is a direct re-
sult of notice failure created by a lack of claiming.54 Illustrative examples of the 
problems associated with unclaimed works are further explored in Part III. 
Today, we have shifted from an opt-in system to a system that automatical-
ly vests protection upon fixation in a tangible medium of expression.55 This 
shift was spurred by a desire to harmonize domestic copyright law with interna-
tional trading partners. But accepting the proposition that copyright protection 
automatically attaches at the moment of fixation does not lead inexorably to the 
conclusion that a copyright holder does not have some responsibility to claim 
her work. The next Part traces the progressive relaxation of formalities in the 
domestic copyright law. 
 
II. History of Claiming 
 
The history of the copyright is a history of public claiming.56 The first fed-
eral copyright law, enacted in 1790, offered copyright protection to authors of 
maps, charts, and books57 who (1) registered a title of the work with the district 
court,58 (2) published a notice of the registration in the newspaper for four 
 53. In a letter from the American Film Heritage Association to Senator Strom 
Thurmond, Chairman Larry Urbanski stated “that as much as 75% of motion 
pictures from the 1920s are no longer clearly owned by anyone, and film 
preservationists as such cannot obtain the necessary permissions to preserve 
them.” Orphan Works, 70 Fed. Reg. 3739, 3740 n.3 (Jan. 26, 2005).  
 54. See Joel Sage, Revenue Streams and Safe Harbors: How Water Law Suggests a 
Solution to Copyright’s Orphan Works Problem, 16 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 294, 298 
(2010). 
 55. Fagundes, supra note 42, at 155 (“The 1976 Act converted copyright from a system 
in which authors had to opt in to possess rights in their work to one in which 
rights vested automatically upon creation of those works regardless of the author’s 
intent or conduct.”). See also Richard A. Epstein, The Dubious Constitutionality of 
the Copyright Term Extension Act, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 123, 124 (2002) 
(“[C]opyright law has flipped over from a system that protected only rights that 
were claimed to one that vests all rights, whether claimed or not.”). 
 56. See, e.g., Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of 
Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771, 
1804-05 (2006); Sorkin, supra note 34, at 591. 
 57. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 3, 1 Stat. 124, 125 (“[F]or the encouragement of 
learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books, to the authors and 
proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned.”). 
 58. Before publication, an author was required to record the title of the map, chart, or 
book with the clerk’s office of the district court where the author resided. Id. § 1, 3, 
1 Stat. 124-25. The Act further provided: 
And the clerk of such court is hereby directed and required to record the 
same forthwith, in a book to be kept by him for that purpose, in the 
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weeks,59 (3) and deposited a copy of the work with the Secretary of State.60 A 
copyright notice on the work itself was not yet required. Copyright protection 
was limited to U.S. citizens and residents,61 and these authors were given the ex-
clusive right of “printing, reprinting, publishing and vending” the work.62 The 
initial term of protection lasted for fourteen years from the date of registering 
the work with the clerk’s office of the district court where the author resides. If 
the author survived the first term, the author could renew the copyright for a 
second fourteen-year term by complying with the same formalities of registra-
tion and newspaper notice.63 
In 1802, the formality of including copyright notice on the work itself was 
added.64 In addition to publishing notice in the newspaper, an author was re-
quired to include a copyright notice on the title page of a book.65 And in 1831, 
words following, (giving a copy thereof to the said author or proprietor, 
under the seal of the court, if he shall require the same.) “District of to 
wit: Be it remembered, That on the day of in the year of the 
independence of the United States of America, A. B. of the said district, 
hath deposited in this office the title of a map, chart, book or books, (as 
the case may be) the right whereof he claims as author or proprietor (as 
the case may be) in the words following, to wit: [here insert the title] in 
conformity to the act of the Congress of the United States, intituled [sic] 
‘An act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of 
maps, charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, 
during the times therein mentioned.’ C. D. clerk of the district of.” 
   Id. § 3. 
 59. Within two months of registration, an author was required to publish a record of 
the copyright registration in one or more U.S. newspapers for a period of four 
weeks. Id. 
 60. Within six months of publication, an author was required to deposit a copy of the 
work with the Secretary of State. Id. § 4. 
 61. Id. § 5 (“[N]othing in this Act shall be construed to extend to prohibit the 
importation or vending, reprinting or publishing within the United States, of any 
map, chart, book or books, written, printed, or published by any person not a 
citizen of the United States, in foreign parts or places without the jurisdiction of 
the United States.”). 
 62. Id. § 1. 
 63. Within the six months preceding the expiration of the initial fourteen-year term, 
an author was required to re-register with the clerk’s office and re-publish the 
registration in the newspapers for four weeks. Id. 
 64. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 1, 2 Stat. 171 (1802). 
 65. Id. An author was required to insert “at full length in the title-page or in the page 
immediately following the title” the following words: “Entered according act of 
Congress, the __ day of 18__ (here insert the date when the same was deposited in 
the office) by A. B. of the state of __ (here insert the author’s or proprietor’s name 
and the state in which he resides.)” Id.  
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Congress again amended the notice provision and extended the term of protec-
tion. The amendment simplified the notice affixed to works and eliminated the 
requirement to also publish notice in the newspaper.66 The initial term of pro-
tection was doubled, to twenty-eight years from publication.67 An author was 
eligible to renew the protection, which was still for an additional fourteen 
years.68 The total term of available protection was forty-two years from registra-
tion. Rather than requiring the author to outlive the initial term of protection, 
the 1831 Act authorized an author’s widow and children to seek the renewal 
term, provided the registration and notice formalities were satisfied again.69 
Failure to comply with these statutorily required formalities meant a work was 
ineligible for the statutory copyright protection, and the work entered the pub-
lic domain.70 
Three years later, copyright holders were allowed, but not required, to pub-
licly claim their assignments. In 1834, copyright assignments could be registered, 
but unregistered assignments were “void against any subsequent purchaser or 
mortgagee for valuable consideration without notice.”71 In 1874, the copyright 
notice provision was simplified further and an author had the option to include 
just the word “Copyright” followed by the year and the author’s name.72 
 66. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 5, 4 Stat. 436, 437 (1831). The notice of copyright 
required the following words: “Entered according to act of Congress, in the year 
__, by A. B., in the clerk’s office of the district court of __ . . . .” Id. 
 67. Id. § 1, 4 Stat. 436. 
 68. Id. § 2, 4 Stat. 436-37. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See, e.g., Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 592-93 (1834) (“No one can deny, that 
where the legislature are about to vest an exclusive right in an author or in an 
inventor, they have the power to provide the conditions on which such right shall 
be enjoyed; and that no one can avail himself of such right, who does not 
substantially comply with the requisites of the law. . . . Every requisite under both 
the acts of congress relative to copyrights, is essential to the title.”); Ewer v. Coxe, 8 
F. Cas. 917, 919 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1824) (“[I]t is most obvious that the proprietor can 
acquire no title to the copyright, unless [the Act] is complied with [inserting ‘at 
full length in the title page, or in the page immediately following the title’ a copy of 
the registration]. He must cause the copy to be inserted as directed, before he can 
be entitled to the benefit of the act of 1790.”). 
 71. Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 157, 4 Stat. 728. Across the pond, in 1842, English 
policymakers abandoned copyright renewals in favor of a straight term of either 
the life of the author plus seven years, or forty-two years from publication, 
whichever was longer. 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45 (1842) (Eng.). 
 72. Act of June 18, 1874, ch. 301, § 1, 18 Stat. 78, 78. The alternative notice provision 
was: “Entered according to act of Congress, in the year __, by A. B., in the office of 
the Librarian of Congress, at Washington.” Id. 18 Stat. 78-79. The act also provided 
that “no person shall maintain an action for the infringement of his copyright 
unless he shall give notice thereof by inserting [notice] in the several copies of 
every edition published . . . .” 
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It was nearly one hundred years after the first federal copyright act before 
protection was offered to foreign authors.73 In 1891, copyright protection was 
extended to foreign authors on three conditions. First, the foreign author’s 
country protected works by U.S. authors on “substantially the same basis” as it 
protected works of its own citizens.74 Second, “the foreign author complied 
with all formalities applicable to works of U.S. authors”, including registration, 
notice, and deposit.75 And third, the work of a foreign author was printed and 
manufactured within the U.S.76 This third requirement, known as the manufac-
turing clause, was one of the most unpopular provisions of U.S. copyright law 
for foreign authors.77 Indeed, scholars have noted that this provision was “one 
of the most serious obstacles blocking United States participation in interna-
tional copyright conventions, and on several occasions threatened to disrupt 
entirely copyright relations between the United States and other nations.”78 
The manufacturing clause required foreign authors (1) to have their works 
printed from type set “within the limits of the United States” and (2) to deposit 
two copies of the domestic imprint with the Librarian of Congress on or before 
the first publication anywhere.79 Foreign authors were especially disadvantaged 
by this requirement.80 For foreign authors, it was virtually impossible to negoti-
 73. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 565, 26 Stat. 1106, 1107. See also RICHARD ROGERS BOWKER, 
COPYRIGHT: ITS HISTORY AND ITS LAW 358-65 (1912) (detailing debate and passage 
of the Chace Bill); Paul J. Sherman, The Universal Copyright Convention: Its Effect 
on United States Law, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 1137, 1140-41 (1955) (“The International 
Copyright Act, as it was known, extended copyright to citizens of a foreign 
country that either offered protection to American citizens on substantially the, 
same basis as its own nationals or was party to an international agreement 
guaranteeing reciprocal protection to which the United States could adhere.”). 
 74. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 565, § 13, 26 Stat. 1106, 1110. 
 75. 1 PATRY, supra note 35, § 1:38. 
 76. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 565, § 3, 26 Stat. 1106, 1107. 
 77. See infra notes 83-87, 190 and accompanying text.  
 78. Sherman, supra note 73, at 1141; see also Hamish R. Sandison, The Berne Convention 
and the Universal Copyright Convention: The American Experience, 11 COLUM.-VLA 
J. L. & ARTS 89, 94 (1986) (“[W]hen the Berne Convention was revised at Berlin in 
1908 to prohibit any formality as a condition of the ‘enjoyment’ and ‘exercise’ of 
copyright, the Manufacturing Clause became a bar to Berne adherence by the 
United States.”). 
 79. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 565, § 4956, 26 Stat. 1106, 1107; see also ELIZABETH K. DUNNE, 
86TH CONG., STUDY NO. 20, DEPOSIT OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 15 (Comm. Print. 
1960) (“The effect of the act of 1891, granting U.S. copyright to foreign authors, 
subject to the requirements of the manufacturing clause, was to bring in deposits 
of some foreign works for the first time.”). 
 80. BOWKER, supra note 73, at 153-61 (summarizing the complexities of the 1891 and 




Claiming the Copyright Post-Macro (Do Not Delete) 7/7/2016 3:29 PM 
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW 34 : 425 2016 
ate for the publication of a U.S. edition before the work was published abroad, 
especially if the author was writing in a foreign language.81 While domestic law 
nominally extended protection, the strictures of the manufacturing clause 
“made the extension of copyright protection to foreigners illusory,” according 
to then-Assistant Register of Copyrights Barbara Ringer.82 
In 1909, Congress made substantial revisions to both the form and sub-
stance of federal copyright protection. Under the 1909 Act, copyright protection 
was secured when a work was published with a proper copyright notice, rather 
than when a work was registered.83 Notice required three items: (1) either the 
word “Copyright” or the abbreviation “Copr.”; (2) the copyright holder’s name; 
and (3) the year of publication.84 But if notice was accidentally omitted, that 
omission would not divest copyright protection. However, an innocent infring-
er misled by the lack of notice would be insulated from damages.85 The right to 
cure an accidental omission of notice was included to soften the harsh conse-
quences of failing to comply with the statutory formalities.86 The innocent in-
 81. DUNNE, supra note 79, at 15.  
 82. Barbara Ringer, The Role of the United States in International Copyright-Past, 
Present and Future, 56 GEO. L.J. 1050, 1057 (1968). 
 83. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 9, 35 Stat. 1075, 1077 (“[A]ny person entitled thereto 
by this Act may secure copyright for his work by publication thereof with the 
notice of copyright required by this Act . . . .”). 
 84. Id. § 18, 35 Stat. 1075, 1079 (providing that proper notice could “consist either of 
the word ‘Copyright’ or the abbreviation ‘Copr.’, accompanied by the name of the 
copyright proprietor, and if the work be printed literary, musical, or dramatic 
work, the notice shall include also the year in which the copyright was secured by 
publication”). 
 85. Id. at § 20 (“[W]here the copyright proprietor has sought to comply with the 
provisions of this Act with respect to notice, the omission by accident or mistake 
of the prescribed notice from a particular copy or copies shall not invalidate the 
copyright or prevent recovery for infringement against any person who, after 
actual notice of the copyright, begins an undertaking to infringe it, but shall 
prevent the recovery of damages against an innocent infringer who has been 
misled by the omission of the notice; and in a suit for infringement no permanent 
injunction shall be had unless the copyright proprietor shall reimburse to the 
innocent infringer his reasonable outlay innocently incurred if the court, in its 
discretion, shall so direct.”). 
 86. A House Committee Report explained:  
Under existing law notice of copyright must be printed in every copy of 
every edition of a book. If any copy of any edition published by authority 
of the proprietor of the copyright by accident or mistake gets out without 
the copyright notice, the whole copyright is lost. More copyright have 
been lost under this drastic provision of the law than in any other way. 
Your committee believe [sic] that an unintentional failure to comply 
with this requirement in the case of a single book ought not to have 
attached to it the penalty involved in the forfeiture of the copyright . . . . 
438 
 
Reid FINAL COPY.docx (Do Not Delete) 7/7/2016 3:29 PM 
CLAIMING THE COPYRIGHT  
fringer defense was, according to copyright scholars, “a very important devel-
opment in the formality scheme,” because “it sought to accommodate those 
who accidentally derogated from compliance (to a small, curable degree) but 
also showed concern for the innocent infringer.”87 
In addition to modifying formalities, the 1909 Act also expanded the subject 
matter of copyright protection to include lectures, dramatic compositions, mu-
sical compositions, works of art, and photographs.88 The Act also codified the 
first sale doctrine89 and doubled the renewal term to twenty-eight years.90 For 
renewed works, the total term of protection was fifty-six years. While registra-
tion was not required for an initial term of copyright protection, it was required 
for renewal.91 An author could register any time during the initial twenty-eight 
year term, and registration was not necessary unless the author wanted to sue or 
to renew the term.92 
Leading up to the 1909 Act, the renewal provision was debated and some 
urged a longer, unitary term rather than a renewal.93 Other countries, like Eng-
land, had already opted for a single, unitary term, rather than a split term.94 But 
in the 1909 Act the renewal principle was retained for two main reasons.95 First, 
the renewal provisions benefited authors by allowing them to capitalize on 
works that succeeded beyond the initial twenty-eight year term. Authors often 
assign their copyrights to publishers when the value of the work is unknown, 
and they have little bargaining power.96 The renewed copyright was seen as a 
new and independent copyright, for which the author could bargain anew with 
the publisher.97 And second, the renewal provision helped filter out undeserv-
  H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 13 (1909).  
 87. Gervais & Renaud, supra note 11, at 1467. 
 88. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 5, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076-78. 
 89. Id. § 41, 35 Stat. 1084 (“[B]ut nothing in this Act shall be deemed to forbid, 
prevent, or restrict the transfer of any copy of a copyrighted work the possession 
of which has been lawfully obtained.”). 
 90. Id. § 23, 35 Stat. 1080. 
 91. Id. §§10, 23-24, 35 Stat. 1078, 1080-81. 
 92. See Shira Perlmutter, Freeing Copyright From Formalities, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. 
L.J. 565, 566 n.6 (1995).  
 93. BARBARA A. RINGER, RENEWAL OF COPYRIGHT (1960), reprinted as 86TH CONG., 
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION STUDY NO. 31, at 105, 117-21 (Comm. Print. 1961). 
 94. 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45 (1842) (Eng.) (adopting a straight term of either life of the author 
plus seven years, or forty two years from publication, whichever was longer). 
 95. RINGER, supra note 93, at 121. 
 96. Id. at 125. 
 97. Id. at 124. 
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ing works that lacked pecuniary and commercial value to the owners.98 Moreo-
ver, the renewal registration, according to Barbara Ringer, offered “a helpful 
starting point in searching copyright title.”99 
It took more than half a century for Congress to gather the consensus to 
make another omnibus revision to copyright. Protection of U.S. works in for-
eign jurisdiction was a major impetus to amend U.S. laws to conform to inter-
national treaties, like the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Work.100 Domestic copyright law was seen as a “copyright island,” that 
was isolated from the international trading community.101 Without reciprocal 
protection in foreign jurisdictions, domestic copyright holders reported losing 
billions of dollars from piracy abroad. 102 There was a growing desire to harmo-
nize domestic law with international copyright laws in order to protect domes-
tic economic interests.103 
The Copyright Act of 1976 brought about a watershed change in U.S. copy-
right law.104 Domestic copyright law changed from an opt-in system that re-
quired compliance with statutory formalities, to a system that automatically 
vested protection for original works of authorship at the moment of fixation.105 
Starting in 1978 (when the 1976 Act became effective), registration became op-
tional and Congress began rolling back copyright formalities in earnest, as a 
 98. Hearings on S. 6330 & H.R. 19853 Before the S. & H. Comms. on Patents, 59th Cong., 
1st Sess. 183, 183 (1906); see also H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222 (1909), S. REP. NO. 60-1108 
(1909). 
 99. RINGER, supra note 93, at 188. 
 100. Berne Convention, supra note 13. The U.S. International Trade Commission 
estimated losses for lack of multinational copyright protection of $6.2 billion in 
1986. Irwin Karp, A Future Without Formalities, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 521, 
522 n.13 (1995). 
 101. David Nimmer, Nation, Duration, Violation, Harmonization: An International 
Copyright Proposal for the United State, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 211, 211 (1992). 
 102. See The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 2, 
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3706; see also WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. 
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 3 (2003) 
(“[B]etween 1987 and 1999, a period of only twelve years, annual U.S. receipts from 
foreign trade in intellectual property rose from $10 billion to $36.5 billion, versus 
U.S. payments to foreign owners of intellectual property in 1999 of only $13 
billion.”). 
 103. See, e.g., William Belanger, U.S. Compliance with the Berne Convention, 3 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 373, 373 (1995). 
 104. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 
U.S.C. § 405 (2012)).  
 105. Id. § 408. At this time, copyright attached at the moment of fixation but the 
copyright could detach if an author published without a copyright notice—and 
failed to timely cure that omission. Id. 
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prelude to joining the Berne Convention.106 The notice requirement became 
more forgiving, and an omission of notice could be cured within a five-year 
window.107 The manufacturing clause was phased out.108 Rather than a split 
copyright protection with an option to renew, there was a single, unitary 
term.109 And the term of protection was calculated from the author’s death, ra-
ther than from publication.110 For natural persons, the term of protection was 
fifty years after death.111 
By 1989, a copyright notice on the work was no longer required,112 and by 
1992, registration renewal was no longer required.113 In 1994, Congress “re-
stored”114 copyright protection to certain categories of works if the author had 
failed to comply with mandatory formalities.115 In 1998, the term of protection 
 106. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 135 (1976) (“Without this change, the possibility of 
future United States adherence to the Berne Copyright Union would evaporate 
. . . .”). 
 107. Under the 1976 Act, copyright notices still needed to be put on published copies of 
works, but the law allowed copyright holders to cure some inadvertent notice 
omissions. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 405, 90 Stat. 2541, 2578 
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 405).  
 108. 17 U.S.C. § 601 (2012). 
 109. With the unitary term, renewal registration became unnecessary for works created 
after 1978. Copyright Act of 1976 § 302. And in 1992 Congress relieved authors of 
works published between January 1, 1964 and December 31, 1977 from the 
obligation to file for renewal certificates. Copyright Amendments Act of 1992, Pub. 
L. No. 102-307, §§ 102(a), 304(a), 106 Stat. 264, 264. 
 110. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 304, 90 Stat. 2541, 2573-76 (1976) 
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 304 (2012)). 
 111. Corporate and anonymous works were protected seventy-five years from the date 
of publication or 100 years from the date of creation, whichever expired first. 
 112. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 7, 102 Stat. 
2853. 
 113. Copyright Renewal Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-307, § 102, 106 Stat. 264, 264 
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (2012)). 
 114. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 882 n.13 (2012) (“Restoration is a misnomer insofar 
as it implies that all works protected under § 104A previously enjoyed protection. 
Each work in the public domain because of lack of national eligibility or subject-
matter protection, and many that failed to comply with formalities, never enjoyed 
U.S. copyright protection.”). 
 115. Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 514, 108 Stat. 
4809, 4976 (1994). Copyright protection for certain foreign works that had fallen 
into the public domain for failure to comply with mandatory formalities was 
restored “for the remainder of the term of copyright that the work would have 
otherwise been granted in the United States if the work never entered the public 
domain in the United States.” 17 U.S.C. § 104A(a)(1)(B) (2012). See also Golan, 132 
S. Ct. 873 (upholding § 514 and concluding that Congress did not exceed its 
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was increased, retroactively and prospectively, from fifty to seventy years after 
an author’s death.116 
The U.S. has progressively relaxed copyright formalities in order to comply 
with the Berne Convention.117 The Berne Convention is widely considered the 
most important multilateral copyright treaty today.118 One hundred sixty eight 
nations have signed it,119 and it has been incorporated into the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.120 
The Berne Convention is predicated on principles of national treatment121 
and automatic protection.122 The Berne Convention provides that authors have 
the same rights to copyrighted material that the Berne Union members grant to 
their own nationals. In other words, foreign authors are accorded the same 
treatment as domestic authors. The second principle is automatic protection. 
Automatic protection is embodied in Article 5(2) of Berne, which provides that 
“[t]he enjoyment and the exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any 
formality; such enjoyment and such exercise are independent of the existence of 
protection in the country of origin of the work.”123 It is commonly understood 
that “enjoyment” refers to the existence and scope of the copyright, whereas 
“exercise” refers to enforcement.124 
authority under the Copyright Clause, and that heightened First Amendment 
review was unnecessary).  
 116. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102(b), 
(d), 112 Stat. 2827, 2827-28 (1998). See also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) 
(affirming the constitutionality of the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act). 
Protection for corporate and anonymous works was extended to ninety-five years 
from the date of publication or 125 from the date of creation, whichever expired 
first. 
 117. See Kenneth D. Crews, Harmonization and the Goals of Copyright: Property Rights 
or Cultural Progress?, 6 GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. J. 117, 119 (1998) (“The pressure for 
international conformity has altered the means for acquiring copyright, has 
restructured the term of copyright duration, and has brought new protection 
under U.S. law where no legal rights previously existed.”). 
 118. Other major international treaties concerning copyright include the Rome 
Convention, the TRIPS Agreement, the WIPO Copyright Treaty, and the WIPO 
Performance and Phonograms Treaty.  
 119. For an updated list of Berne members, see Signatories to the Berne Convention, 
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp 
?lang=en&treaty_id=15 (last visited June 5, 2016). 
 120. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994). 
 121. Berne Convention, supra note 13, art. 5(1). 
 122. Id. art. 5(2). 
 123. Id.  
 124. See Gervais & Renaud, supra note 11, at 1472. 
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But the Berne Convention has not always been formality-free. The first in-
carnation of the Berne Convention, in 1886, required that authors comply with 
the formalities of their home country to receive protection in other Berne-
signatory countries.125 But in 1908, the Berne Convention was amended because 
assessing if an author had complied with her country of origin’s formalities was 
too difficult, thus formality-free protection was adopted.126 The resistance to 
formalities has pragmatic foundations, rather than a deep antipathy toward 
formalities per se.127 By the time the United States seriously considered joining 
the convention, though, it was unique in requiring authors to comply with 
formalities.128 
While a majority of U.S. formalities have been rolled back to join the Berne 
Convention, not all formalities have been eliminated. For example, a domestic 
copyright holder must register a work as a prerequisite to filing an infringement 
suit.129 And for domestic and foreign copyright holders, statutory damages and 
attorneys’ fees are not available for infringement that takes place before registra-
tion.130 If a copyright notice appears on a hard copy of the work, the innocent 
infringement defense is unavailable.131 These provisions were intended to pro-
 125. Berne Convention, supra note 13, art. 2(2); accord Gervais & Renaud, supra note 11, 
at 1471. 
 126. Berne Convention, supra note 13, art. 4(2).  
 127. Stef van Gompel, Copyright Formalities and the Reasons for the Decline in 
Nineteenth-Century Europe, in PRIVILEGE AND PROPERTY: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY 
OF COPYRIGHT 157, 158 (Ronan Deazley et al. eds., 2010) (“Thus, the rationale 
behind the [Berne Convention] proscription of formalities at the international 
level seems to be practical rather than idealistic.”); Sprigman, supra note 33, at 545 
(“[I]t is important to understand that Berne’s antiformality principle does not 
arise from any supposed foundational incompatibility between formalities and an 
authors’ rights copyright framework.”). 
 128. Karp, supra note 100, at 522 (“An additional basis for the U.S.’s gradual 
progression toward a less stringent copyright environment was that the U.S. was 
unique in its imposition of formalities and the resulting destruction of domestic 
copyright protection for thousands of foreign authors.”); Perlmutter, supra note 
92, at 567 (“By the early twentieth century, this extensive system of formalities had 
become peculiar to U.S. law, placing us out of step with the rest of the world.”).  
 129. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2012).  
 130. Id. § 412. There are additional requirements to qualify for protection under the 
Visual Artists Rights Act, including that for limited edition works of 200 copies or 
fewer, they must be signed and consecutively numbered by the author. Id. § 101 
(defining “work of visual art”). 
 131. Today, a copyright notice on a copyrighted work serves as a bar to a minimum 
damage award. Id. § 504(c)(2); see also id. § 402 (except as provided in § 504(c)(2), 
when a copy or phonorecord bears a properly affixed notice, “no weight shall be 
given to such a defendant’s interposition of a defense based on innocent 
infringement in mitigation of actual or statutory damages”). 
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vide powerful incentives for copyright holders to register voluntarily.132 But as 
discussed in Parts III and IV below, these incentives are not enough to prevent 
deadweight losses and notice failure. 
 
III. Claiming Today 
 
We no longer require a copyright holder to claim an interest in her work. 
Today, our formality-optional system has swept within the bounds of copyright 
far more works for far longer than was initially contemplated. And copyright’s 
bounds are larger than ever. Not only has the subject matter of copyright ex-
panded, but the rights have expanded too.133 Once limited to books, maps, and 
charts, today’s copyright protects a full range of works including photographs, 
sound recordings, and computer programs. And once limited to verbatim or 
near-verbatim copying of a whole work,134 today’s copyright allows authors to 
prevent reproduction, distribution, public performance and display, as well as 
the creation of derivatives.135 
The consequences for the expansive protection of original works of author-
ship are magnified with the Internet and the digital age. The digital environ-
ment has remade the relationship between listeners and speakers.136 The line be-
tween author and reader, between creator and user, is blurred in the digital 
ecosystem.137 Modern technology has enabled nearly all of us to be publishers,138 
 132. See, e.g., Oliar et al., supra note 1, at 2215-19; David R. Hansen et al., Solving the 
Orphan Works Problem for the United States, 37 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 1, 48 (2013); 
Perlmutter, supra note 92, at 569 (“The overall goal of the changes in the law was 
to make registration an optional rather than a mandatory system, encouraged by 
the carrot of ‘special remedies’ rather than impelled by the stick of loss of rights.”).  
 133. See Jessica Litman, Billowing White Goo, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 587, 599-600 (2008) 
(suggesting that copyright rights have expanded such that they now “spill out all 
over personal uses like billowing white goo”). 
 134. See Samuelson et al., supra note 37, at 1191 (“In the early years of modern copyright 
law, only exact or near-exact copying of the whole of a copyrighted work, which 
would obviously undermine the primary market for authorized copies of the 
author’s work, was deemed an infringement of copyright.”). 
 135. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
 136. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Can Formalities Save the Public Domain? Reconsidering 
Formalities for the 2010s, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1537, 1547 (2013) (“The digital 
environment is also transforming the creative process, blurring the distinction 
between authors and users, consumers and producers, exploiters and creators. 
Works in digital format can be easily mixed and matched, cut and pasted, or 
edited and remixed. The ease of changing and adapting enables users to 
appropriate cultural icons to express new meanings and to aggregate existing 
works into new content.”). 
 137. Id. at 1545. 
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whereas in 1790 there were only a handful of publishers in the United States. 
Today, copyright affects regular folks, not just specialized industries.139 Copy-
righted works are created with ease, and they are infringed with equal ease.140 
And we have coupled the expansive protection of modern copyright and the 
digital age with the reduction in formalities.141 This lack of formalities has made 
ownership “muddier.”142 The externalities of this opacity include a diminished 
public storehouse of creative works from which others can draw. 
Several societal harms flow from uncertain ownership.143 Uncertain owner-
ship retards the creation of new works,144 like adaptations by documentary 
filmmakers.145 Uncertain ownership undermines digital dissemination of cul-
tural and scientific works by museums and libraries.146 Cultural works held hos-
 138. See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 31, at 169 (“[C]omputers have changed everything. 
Digital architecture has so drastically reduced the cost of creating and distributing 
expression that today we can all be authors and publishers . . . .”). 
 139. Samuelson et al., supra note 37, at 1177. 
 140. Gibson, supra note 31, at 214-15 (detailing a range of online activity that implicates 
a copyright holder’s exclusive rights “from forwarding e-mail, backing up data, 
and printing a hard copy of an online document to caching frequently accessed 
files, cataloging Internet sites, and webcasting one’s travels,” and noting that our 
world is “replete with copyrighted content that is constantly being infringed”). 
 141. WILLIAM PATRY, HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT 204 (2012) (“In the past, a short term of 
copyright coupled with formalities and the natural restraints that arose in the hard 
copy world—significant costs in production and distribution—limited the 
public’s innocent exposure to copyright infringement. With a functionally 
perpetual copyright duration, no formalities, and instant global distribution, 
matters have greatly changed.”). 
 142. Fagundes, supra note 42, at 155 (noting that eliminating formalities “made 
copyright entitlements muddier, by robbing the public of a key means of 
ascertaining the ownership status of a given work”). 
 143. See, e.g., Libby Greismann, Note, The Greatest Book You Will Never Read: Public 
Access Rights and the Orphan Works Dilemma, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 193, 200 
(2012) (“When the author cannot be found, subsequent creators are dissuaded 
from creating new works that incorporate those existing works, resulting in a net 
loss for the creative wealth of society.”). 
 144. See, e.g., Sami J. Valkonen & Lawrence J. White, An Economic Model for the 
Incentive/Access Paradigm of Copyright Propertization: An Argument in Support of 
the Orphan Works Act, 29 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 359, 388-93 (2007). 
 145. Comments of the Int’l Documentary Ass’n et al. in the Matter of Orphan Works 
and Mass Digitization (Feb. 4, 2013), http://copyright.gov/orphan/comments/noi 
_10222012/International-Documentary-Association.pdf.  
 146. See, e.g., Comments of the Art Inst. of Chi. et al. in the Matter of Orphan Works 
and Mass Digitization (Feb. 4, 2013), http://copyright.gov/orphan/comments/noi 
_10222012/Museums.pdf; Response by the Cornell Univ. Library to the Notice of 
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tage by unknown copyright owners have included unreleased jazz recordings 
from the 1930s and 1940s,147 photographs and artifacts housed at the U.S. Holo-
caust Memorial Museum,148 and historical literature tracing the evolution of ru-
ral life and agricultural economy in the United States.149 Large-scale digital ar-
chives offer unprecedented data mining opportunities for scholars,150 yet 
uncertain ownership of the works threatens public availability.151 
Uncertain ownership also impairs free speech interests in a robust public 
domain. Uncertain ownership holds works hostage from the public.152 Three 
examples illustrate this problem. The first example comes from the Frontera 
Collection at UCLA, which is reputed to be the “largest repository of Mexican 
and Mexican-American vernacular recordings in existence.”153 Notwithstanding 
the “value of the collection to students, scholars, and the community” the 
UCLA library director noted that “copyright law prevents the Library from 
making this work fully available because most of it is covered under copyright 
and we are unable to locate the copyright owners.”154 The second example is 
 147. Steven Seidenberg, Orphaned Treasures: A Trove of Historic Jazz Recordings Has 
Found a Home in Harlem, But You Can’t Hear Them, A.B.A. J., May 2011, at 48. 
 148. Balancing the Interests of Copyright Owners and Users: Hearing Before the H. 
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property and the H. Committee on 
the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 64-67 (2008) (statement of Karen Coe, Assoc. Legal 
Counsel, U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum) (noting the Museum has 
“approximately 42 million pages of archival documents, 77,000 photographs, 
9,000 recorded oral histories, 985 hour of historical film footage, and its library 
contains 72,000 items in 55 languages”—many of which are orphan works). 
 149. The Core Historical Literature of Agriculture: Background Of This Collection, ALBERT 
R. MANN LIBRARY, CORNELL UNIV., http://chla.library.cornell.edu/c/chla/about 
.html (last visited June 5, 2015). See also Response by the Cornell Univ. Library to 
the Notice of Inquiry Concerning Orphan Works, Comment OW0569, at 1-2 
(Mar. 23, 2005), http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/OW0569-Thomas 
.pdf. 
 150. See, e.g., Content, Contest, and Capacity: A Collaborative Digitization Project on the 
Long Civil Rights Movement in North Carolina, TRIANGLE RESEARCH LIBRARY 
NETWORK, http://www2.trln.org/ccc/index.htm (last visited June 5, 2015) (a 
collaborative large-scale manuscripts digitization project). 
 151. Matthew L. Jockers et al., Digital Archives: Don’t Let Copyright Block Data Mining, 
NATURE, Oct. 4, 2012, at 29-30.  
 152. See Loren, supra note 43, at 1434 (“I conclude that these works should not be 
viewed as ‘orphans,’ but rather as ‘hostages’—constrained in their movement by 
the restricting combination of copyright law and the absence of copyright owners 
who could release works from their confinement.”). 
 153. Letter from Gary E. Strong, Univ. Library & Dir., UCLA, to Jule L. Sigall, Assoc. 
Register for Pol’y & Int’l Affairs, U.S. Copyright Office 10 (Mar. 2005), http://www 
.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/OW0473-Strong.pdf.  
 154. Id.  
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from a Cornell University librarian who recounted a similar orphan works ex-
perience for art work created by a Japanese-American while at the Poston War 
Relocation Center during World War II: “The current copyright owner has 
since disappeared and the paintings have become orphan—and no future 
scholar can publish them again until they enter the public domain, some 120 
years after the date of the events they depict.”155 And the third example involves 
the reissue of early sound recordings by African-Americans, which was planned 
to accompany the release of the book, Lost Sounds: Blacks and the Birth of the 
Recording Industry, 1890-1919.156 But the release “had to be aborted because of 
the time and cost involved in locating and dealing with rights holders,” accord-
ing to the book’s author.157 These are only three examples that illustrate the rich 
diversity of cultural works that are held hostage by copyright and unknown 
copyright holders. 
The scope of the problem of unknown copyright holders is hard to over-
state.158 Orphan works can affect not only cultural institutions but also com-
mercial creators and individuals.159 Works of cultural value to scholars and ar-
chivists, like photographs, letters, and sound recordings, are likely to be 
orphaned.160 Works of historically marginalized communities, like racial and 
religious minorities, women, the poor, and Native Americans, are also likely to 
be unclaimed because of poor attribution and inadequate recordkeeping.161 
Modern digital works, like digital photographs and sound recording samples, 
are also likely to become orphaned because digital technology allows works to 
 155. Response by the Cornell Univ. Library to the Notice of Inquiry Concerning 
Orphan Works, Comment OW0569, at 3 (Mar. 23, 2005), http://copyright.gov/ 
orphan/comments/OW0569-Thomas.pdf. 
 156. Letter from Tim Brooks to Jule L. Sigall, Assoc. Register for Pol’y & Int’l Affairs, 
U.S. Copyright Office 2 (Mar. 23, 2005), http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/ 
comments/OW0579-Brooks.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Tim Brooks to Jule L. 
Sigall]. 
 157. Id.  
 158. See, e.g., Robert Kirk Walker, Negotiating the Unknown: A Compulsory Licensing 
Solution to the Orphan Works Problem, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 983, 989 (2014); Mark 
Tratos, Informal Formalities: The Government’s Attempt to Find Families for 
Orphan Works, 3 INTELL. PROP. BRIEF 42 (2011); Sage, supra note 54, at 300. 
 159. See Vicenç Feliú, Orphans in Turmoil: How A Legislative Solution Can Help Put the 
Orphan Works Dilemma to Rest, 12 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 107, 110 (2015); 
Hansen et al., supra note 132, at 14. 
 160. Katharina de la Durantaye, Finding A Home for Orphans: Google Book Search and 
Orphan Works Law in the United States and Europe, 21 FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 229, 234-35 (2011). 
 161. Brianna Dahlberg, Note, The Orphan Works Problem: Preserving Access to the 
Cultural History of Disadvantaged Groups, 20 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 275, 288 
(2011) (“[T]he orphan works problem disproportionately impacts access to 
cultural works by minorities, women, and other disadvantaged groups.”). 
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be separated from ownership information.162 This is a problem for new works, 
as well as old works, and one that is not likely to go away any time soon. 
The problem of unclaimed works was not an unanticipated consequence of 
abandoning the notice formalities. Congress nevertheless pursued this policy 
change. In an attempt to explain Congress’s largesse with regard to copyright, 
some scholars have observed the mentality that “if a little copyright law is good, 
more is always better.”163 But a little now goes a long way—specifically seventy 
years after the author’s death. And it is far from clear that more copyright law 
leads to more creative works for the public to enjoy.164 
It is also not evident that all original works of authorship fixed in a tangible 
medium of expression want, need, or warrant copyright protection.165 When 
copyright offers the same protection to voicemail messages and honey-do lists 
as it does to novels and movies, perhaps it is worth reconsidering the default 
presumption of full protection without any affirmative claiming by the author. 
Works created with little regard for copyright are extended the same protection 
as works that are deeply reliant on copyright as a vehicle for financial compen-
sation. And it is uncertain whether an author can efficiently disclaim her copy-
 162. See The “Orphan Works” Problem and Proposed Legislation: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of 
Copyrights), http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat031308.html; Comment on 
Orphan Works Study (70 FR 3739) from Brad Holland & Cynthia Turner, 
Illustrators’ P’ship of Am., to Jule L. Sigall, Assoc. Register for Policy & Int’l 
Affairs, U.S. Copyright Office (Mar. 24 2005), http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/ 
comments/OW0660-Holland-Turner.pdf; see also Comments on Notice of 
Inquiry Regarding Orphan Works from Stephen Morris, Prof’l Photographers of 
Am., to Jule L. Sigall, Assoc. Register for Policy & Int’l Affairs, U.S. Copyright 
Office (Mar. 25, 2005), http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/OW0642-
PPA.pdf. 
 163. Raymond Shih Ray Ku et al., Does Copyright Law Promote Creativity? An Empirical 
Analysis of Copyright’s Bounty, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1669, 1681 (2009). 
 164. Id. at 1708 (“At the very least, our findings cast serious doubt on the idea that, with 
copyright law, one size fits all. In other words, there is little support for the broad 
proposition that one may expect changes in copyright law to have a predictable 
and uniform effect across all creative works, whether those works are books, sound 
recordings, or musical compositions. Even interpreted in the light most favorable 
to our hypotheses, the evidence suggests that it is at best slightly better than a coin 
toss whether a legal change will have any effect upon a single category of creative 
works.”). 
 165. See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 31, at 215 (“Because copyright protection attaches the 
instant an original thought is expressed in fixed form, these newly empowered 
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right to the public domain.166 Copyright attaches whether or not the author 
wants, needs, or knows it—for seventy years after an author’s death. 
It is not clear that copyright is the driver of creation for most texts, tweets, 
and selfies, rather than just an afterthought.167 Our digital ephemera likely have 
little regard for copyright. The same can be said of many private letters, family 
photographs, and personal diaries. While such works may have little commer-
cial value, they can have high cultural and historic value. 
Scholars have denominated works for which copyright was only an after-
thought as the “dark matter” of copyright.168 For these works, copyright is nei-
ther a consideration nor an incentive. Copyright-as-afterthought risks under-
mining respect for copyright. When the creator of dark matter does not care 
about copyright, it is hard to get the public to respect copyright as a whole.169 
The breadth of copyright today leads to innumerable technical violations that 
social norms would regard as innocuous.170 Copyright’s indiscriminate ubiquity 
defies common sense.171 
The consequences of too much indiscriminate copyright are considerable. 
We face an ever growing private domain and a shrinking public domain. We 
 166. Lydia Pallas Loren, Building A Reliable Semicommons of Creative Works: 
Enforcement of Creative Commons Licenses and Limited Abandonment of Copyright, 
14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 271, 320 (2007) (“Whether a copyright owner can abandon 
a portion of the rights granted to him remains an open question.”); see also 
Timothy K. Armstrong, Shrinking the Commons: Termination of Copyright Licenses 
and Transfers for the Benefit of the Public, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 359, 362 (2010) 
(noting uncertainty about “whether an author may use the statute’s termination 
provisions to rescind her own express dedication of a work to the public 
domain”). 
 167. Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683, 740 (2003) 
(“[C]opyright law might want to distinguish authors whose expressive activities 
are motivated by copyright from authors for whom copyright was an 
afterthought.”). 
 168. See Stef van Gompel, Copyright Formalities in the Internet Age: Filters of Protection 
or Facilitators of Licensing, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1425, 1432 (2013) (quoting Fred 
von Lohmann, Senior Copyright Counsel at Google). 
 169. See Gibson, supra note 31, at 230-31. 
 170. John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm Gap, 
2007 UTAH L. REV. 537, 543-48. 
 171. Pamela Samuelson, Is Copyright Reform Possible?, 126 HARV. L. REV. 740, 751 (2013) 
(noting that restoring formalities “would breed more respect for copyright law 
because the current law’s promiscuous ubiquity—under which even grocery lists, 
emails, and mobile phone photos are automatically protected for seven decades 
past their authors’ lives—runs counter to common sense and is economically 
unnecessary and inefficient”). 
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face a virtually perpetual copyright term,172 even for works of unknown owners. 
The problem of unknown and unfindable copyright holders threatens the crea-
tion of new works, scholarly access to digitized archives of disintegrating analog 
works, and the fodder necessary for robust public discourse. Rather than serv-
ing as the engine of progress, copyright now is a burden on speech and creativi-
ty.173 
This is the right time for this conversation. Calls for copyright reform are 
everywhere.174 Domestic175 and international176 policymakers are grappling with 
the notice failure externalities caused by a reduction in formalities. Solutions to 
the orphan works problem are presently being debated in the United States177 
and the European Union.178 Part IV outlines my proposal for “new-style” for-
malities as a solution to notice failure.179 
 
 
 172. Sprigman, supra note 33, at 522 (“The copyright term is now sufficiently long that 
the net present value to the rightsholder of a copyright is practically 
indistinguishable from what it would be under a perpetual term.”). 
 173. See Valkonen & White, supra note 144, at 361-62 (“[T]he copyright regime should 
protect creativity, not creators.”). 
 174. See, e.g., Gervais & Renaud, supra note 11, at 1470 (arguing “a renewed discussion 
on formalities is both timely and necessary”); see also Note, Copyright Reform and 
the Takings Clause, 128 HARV. L. REV. 973, 973 (2015) (“Over the last fifteen years, 
there has been a marked uptick in scholarly and popular calls for the reform, or 
even the replacement, of the copyright system.”); Samuelson, supra note 171, at 740 
(“Copyright law has taken quite a beating in the legal literature in the past decade 
or so.”). 
 175. Feliú, supra note 159, at 107 (“The orphan works issue has continued to grow in the 
United States despite strong efforts to find a workable solution.”). 
 176. See, e.g., IAN HARGREAVES, DIGITAL OPPORTUNITY: A REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND GROWTH 38 (2011), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/ 
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/32563/ipreview-finalreport.pdf.  
 177. See Orphan Works, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://www.copyright.gov/orphan 
(last visited June 5, 2016); (providing overview of and resources concerning the 
orphan works issue); ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION, supra note 44. 
 178. Directive 2012/28/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 
2012 on Certain Permitted Uses of Orphan Works art. 1(1), 2012 O.J. (L 299) 8, 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32012L0028&rid 
=1; Impact Assessment on the Cross-Border Online Access to Orphan Works 
Accompanying Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Certain Permitted Uses of Orphan Works (Euro. Comm’n, Staff 
Working Paper, May 24, 2011), http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/ia_carried 
_out/docs/ia_2011/sec_2011_0615_en.pdf. 
 179. See, e.g., Michael W. Carroll, A Realist Approach to Copyright Law’s Formalities, 28 
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IV. A Modest Proposal: Claim the Copyright 
 
I propose incentivizing a copyright holder to publicly claim her work. And 
if she fails to do so, I propose a robust defense to users of unclaimed works. The 
goal of my proposal is to increase productive and socially beneficial uses of un-
claimed works by decreasing the risks of using these unclaimed works. There 
are a host of advantages that flow from requiring a copyright holder to claim an 
interest in her work. These advantages, explored below, include a workable so-
lution to the orphan works problem, functional replenishment of the public 
domain, and decreased transaction costs to license works. And as discussed be-
low, this proposal complies with our international obligations under the Berne 
Convention. 
The pendulum has swung on the prevailing views of formalities.180 Formali-
ties may have been at their height under the 1909 Act, which included the man-
ufacturing clause and renewal provisions. Leading up to the 1976 Act, the chal-
lenge against formalities was mounting. The main criticisms against formalities 
centered on fairness. Formalities were seen as a trap for the unwary because 
compliance was onerous and cumbersome.181 Many copyrights were lost be-
cause of strict interpretation and technical defects in the notice and registra-
tion.182 Formalities were also costly,183 which tended to favor commercial crea-
tors. And elements like the manufacturing clause184 were protectionist for U.S. 
authors, which engendered strong antipathy from foreign authors toward U.S. 
formalities.185 
 180. See, e.g., Séverine Dusollier, (Re)Introducing Formalities in Copyright as a Strategy 
for the Public Domain, in OPEN CONTENT LICENSING: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 
75, 103-05 (Lucie Guibault & Christina Angelopoulos eds., 2011); STEF VAN GOMPEL, 
FORMALITIES IN COPYRIGHT LAW 1-8 (2011); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW 
BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND 
CONTROL CREATIVITY 290-91 (2004). 
 181. See, e.g., Molly Schaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX. 
L. REV. 1535, 1541 n.26 (2005) (“[T]he formalities of U.S. copyright law had long 
been criticized as hypertechnical traps for unsophisticated authors.”). 
 182. See Gervais & Renaud, supra note 11, at 1461 (“A number of formalities were 
difficult to comply with, and many works were thus accidentally unregistered or 
registered incorrectly.”); see also CATHERINE SEVILLE, THE INTERNATIONALISATION 
OF COPYRIGHT LAW: BOOKS, BUCCANEERS AND THE BLACK FLAG IN THE NINETEENTH 
CENTURY 248 (2006). 
 183. See Sprigman, supra note 33, at 493. 
 184. See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 565, § 4956, 26 Stat. 1106, 1107. 
 185. See, e.g., 1 PATRY, supra note 35, § 1:38 (“[T]he manufacturing clause, remained, in 
amended form, a most unfortunate part of U.S. copyright law until July 1, 1986. 
The conditioning of copyright protection on local printing was a reactionary 
return to the monopolistic days of the Stationers Company, where the interests of 
printers and booksellers were primary.”); Gervais & Renaud, supra note 11, at 1463 
(“The perceived burden of complying with formalities and the strict application of 
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The 1976 Act signaled a major policy shift as the United States sought to 
conform its copyright laws to the Berne Convention. We shifted from a system 
that required public claiming to a system that required no affirmative acts be-
yond fixing an original work of authorship in a tangible medium of expression. 
This shift has created the orphan works problem and impoverished the public 
domain. In response to these concerns, there has been a resurgence in the for-
mality debate. Formalities are now said to be in the “zeitgeist.”186 This is the 
time to consider how to thoughtfully reconstruct copyright law for the modern 
digital age. 
Before exploring what appropriate formalities might look like, it is worth 
noting that a number of criticisms have been raised at the prospect of reintro-
ducing formalities. Some criticisms are of a philosophical nature, whereas oth-
ers have a pragmatic basis. 
Some who resist the reintroduction of formalities champion a natural 
rights perspective on copyright.187 From the Lockean view, a person is entitled 
to the fruits of her labor.188 And from a moral rights perspective, an author’s 
personality that is reflected in a work of authorship is entitled to legal protec-
tion.189 Formalities that force an author to make an affirmative claim on her 
copyright, or risk losing protection, are thought to be in basic conflict with 
these principles. But these perspectives are not irreconcilable with the notion of 
limited rights. Even countries that embrace natural and moral rights philoso-
the U.S. manufacturing clause may also have been in the minds of the Berne 
negotiators in Berlin, which resulted in the adoption of the broad ban on 
formalities.”); Robert Spoo, Note, Copyright Protectionism and Its Discontents: The 
Case of James Joyce’s Ulysses in America, 108 YALE L.J. 633, 645 (1998) (“Clearly, the 
legislative purpose behind the manufacturing clause, in both its 1891 and its 1909 
incarnations, was protection of American labor from the effects of foreign 
importation. . . . Since works that could not comply with the manufacturing clause 
enjoyed no copyright protection, the clause helped create the conditions necessary 
for book piracy—a fact that led Ezra Pound to complain of ‘the thieving copyright 
law.’”). 
 186. Gervais & Renaud, supra note 11, at 1496. 
 187. See, e.g., Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 
(1988) (discussing natural rights philosophy of copyright); Arthur Levine, The End 
of Formalities: No More Second-Class Copyright Owners, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. 
L.J. 553, 553 (1995) (arguing that formalities “inhibit[] the ability of a copyright 
owner to enjoy the full fruits of her work”). 
 188. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and 
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993). 
 189. See, e.g., Edward J. Damich, The Right of Personality: A Common-Law Basis for the 
Protection of the Moral Rights of Authors, 23 GA. L. REV. 1 (1988). 
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phies seek to balance interests of creators and users, and these countries do not 
offer perpetual protection.190 
Another criticism against the reintroduction of formalities is that they do 
not scale when applied to a large volume of works. Specifically, formalities 
could be prohibitively expensive for creators of large amounts of content.191 For 
example, it has been suggested that it would not be feasible for authors who 
publish digital content online several times a day to comply with copyright 
formalities.192 But this practical concern is not insurmountable. Concerns about 
monetary cost could be addressed with something akin to a flexible spending 
account at the Copyright Office or a blanket fee.193 And concerns about process 
costs could be addressed with an annual registration option for high volume 
creators.194 
Another concern surrounds the unknown value of works. Some inexperi-
enced creators may not know which of their works are worth claiming.195 Yet 
this valuation problem exists in today’s copyright structure. Authors often do 
not know the value of their copyrights when they transfer their works to pub-
lishers.196 Congress was mindful of this and enacted the termination right to 
protect authors from un-remunerative assignment deals.197 But a copyright 
holder’s ignorance about whether to claim her work is not worth the current 
deadweight costs on the public. We do not protect ignorant property owners in 
other situations. Much like someone selling estate items, sometimes property 
owners do not know the full value of their property. On balance, if the creator 
values it, she should claim it or otherwise bear the risk that someone else can 
put it to use.198 
 190. Sprigman, supra note 33, at 543 (“[E]ven in so-called ‘natural rights’ systems, 
copyrights expire, works enter the public domain, and the law therefore must seek 
some form of ‘utilitarian’ balance between private incentives and public access.”). 
 191. Brad A. Greenberg, Comment, More Than Just A Formality: Instant Authorship 
and Copyright’s Opt-Out Future in the Digital Age, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1028, 1048 
(2012). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Jane C. Ginsburg, The U.S. Experience with Copyright Formalities: A Love/Hate 
Relationship, 33 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 311, 346 (2010). 
 194. Id. 
 195. See Greenberg, supra note 191, at 1048-49. 
 196. Lydia Pallas Loren, Renegotiating the Copyright Deal in the Shadow of the 
“Inalienable” Right to Terminate, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1329, 1346 (2010) (“[T]he policy 
justification for the termination rights is the valuation problem inherent in 
estimating the commercial worth of a work before it has been exploited and in 
judging its commercial longevity.”). 
 197. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304 (2012). 
 198. Under my proposal discussed below, if the work does turn out to be valuable, the 
copyright holder could collect a reasonable license fee. A copyright holder would 
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Others worry that formalities will favor commercial copyright interests 199 
and disadvantage smaller entities and individual authors.200 Some fear that 
formalities would again become a trap for the unwary.201 The concern is that 
formalities would hurt the least informed and the least affluent.202 Registration 
might be too burdensome for individual authors.203 And authors of user-
generated content may not be well suited to calculate and evaluate the potential 
commercial success of their works to decide whether to comply with formali-
ties.204 But the current formalities already disfavor non-commercial authors. 
For example, statutory damages are not a meaningful incentive for the average 
have the option to claim the work and try to collect additional rents against future 
users. 
 199. Elkin-Koren, supra note 136, at 1543 (noting a commercial bias in reinstituting 
formalities); Julia D. Mahoney, Lawrence Lessig’s Dystopian Vision, 90 VA. L. REV. 
2305, 2329-30 (2004) (noting “corporate copyright holders are likely to have a 
much easier time negotiating the system than the lone individual creator, and that 
a turn to more formalities could bestow an advantage on none other than the ‘Big 
Media’ interests”). 
 200. Elkin-Koren, supra note 136, at 1551-52 (arguing that formalities, if reintroduced, 
could “strengthen existing commercial players and marginalize individual creators 
and collaborative initiatives”); Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The 
Limits of Private Ordering in Facilitating a Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 
375, 383 n.27 (2005) (observing that formalities “could actually discriminate against 
individual creators who are unable to carry the burden of legal counseling and 
registration”). 
 201. Charles Ossola, Registration and Remedies: Recovery of Attorney’s Fees and Statutory 
Damages Under the Copyright Reform Act, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 557, 561 
(1995) (“If anyone is of the opinion that there are no such registration errors, he 
should sit through a deposition with a client when he is asked to justify his 
position on work made for hire in light of Reid factors, joint work in light of 
recent case law, or what constitutes preexisting material for the purpose of 
derivative works.”). 
 202. See Ginsburg, supra note 193, at 314; see also Perlmutter, supra note 92, at 586 (“It is 
not good policy for any legal regime to penalize the unwary, the less well-off, and 
the less sophisticated. The reality is that many individual authors fall into one or 
more of these categories when it comes to the technical requirements of copyright 
law. They have little legal expertise, either personally or readily available. We 
should not make the choice that conditions rights on such expertise.”). 
 203. See Ossola, supra note 201, at 560. 
 204. Elkin-Koren, supra note 136, at 1552 (“User-authors often operate outside a market 
scheme, and the creative output is often a byproduct of activities done for fun, for 
social or political purposes, or for the sake of experience, experimentation, or self-
expression. In such cases user-authors are unlikely to have any structured 
procedure for evaluating the commercial potential of a work.”). 
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author; they favor institutional actors.205 Moreover, for authors who create 
without a profit motive, most litigation-based incentives are irrelevant.206 And 
as noted above, the valuation uncertainty exists today and is not unique to cop-
yrighted works. It is manifest with tangible property too. 
I acknowledge there are distributive concerns, but I believe they are overes-
timated. Appropriate use of technology, combined with a simple registration 
form, could prevent public claiming from being too burdensome for average 
creators. As a point of comparison, in 2005 Congress authorized a preregistra-
tion formality for unpublished works that served to supplement, but not sup-
plant, the optional registration formality.207 Industry forces, including the Mo-
tion Picture Association of America, sought a way to enjoin prerelease 
infringement, such as when a movie is leaked on the Internet before it is re-
leased in theatres. Preregistration of a work enables a copyright holder to bring 
suit in federal court and receive statutory damages and attorney’s fees. Prelimi-
nary data from this preregistration formality suggest individual users are not 
disproportionately and adversely impacted by this preregistration formality.208 
Researchers have observed that the majority of users of the preregistration sys-
tem have been individuals, small entities, and other non-repeat players.209 In 
light of this recent experience with the preregistration formalities, I proffer that 
the new-style formality I propose would not disadvantage individuals and non-
commercial creators.210 
Another concern about reintroducing formalities is that, without the full 
right to exclude, authors would lack an incentive to create. Without a limited 
monopoly right, the nonexcludable, nonrivalrous nature of copyright means an 
author would be unable to prevent others from copying and using the work. 
Authors would lack the financial incentive to create works for which the return 
is less than the cost of investment. But often other doctrines are available to 
help protect against activity that might discourage creation, such as privacy, 
 205. Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A 
Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 454 (2009) (“The prompt 
registration requirement for statutory damages has not become a meaningful 
inducement to registration for all authors who value copyright protection, but 
rather a substantial boon to major copyright industry players-the commercial 
exploiters of copyrighted works whose rights largely derive from the Act’s work for 
hire rules or assignments from authors.”). 
 206. Sprigman, supra note 33, at 495. 
 207. Oliar & Matich, supra note 41, at 1077-79. 
 208. Id. at 1120. 
 209. Id. 
 210. While a registration formality in itself may not favor commercial over non-
commercial entities, the amount of the registration fee could have a disparate 
impact and needs to be calibrated carefully. Id. at 1125-26 (noting “the fee elasticity 
of preregistration likely changes with the type of preregistrant” and that it is “small 
entities and individual authors who are particularly sensitive to increases in fees”). 
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misappropriation, and unfair competition. Indeed, copyright is often ill-
equipped to protect privacy interests.211 Whether it is a rap music star seeking to 
enjoin a magazine from publishing racist lyrics he wrote in his youth, or the 
Church of Scientology invoking copyright protection to protect its scripture 
from public distribution, or a famously reclusive author preventing the publica-
tion of a biography containing excerpts of his writings,212 copyright is an inap-
propriate vehicle. In such instances, copyright can lead to censorship rather 
than the progress of science and learning. 
There are still others who express concerns about the Berne Convention. 
Article 5(2) prohibits formalities that affect the enjoyment or the exercise of 
copyright. The rejection of constitutive formalities was driven by pragmatic 
considerations. Berne’s no-formality movement developed at a time when for-
malities were cumbersome and indeed a trap for the unwary.213 It was hard to 
know if an author had complied with her home country’s formalities.214 In ad-
dition to complying with her home country’s formalities, some Berne countries 
required foreign authors to comply with the same formalities as domestic au-
thors.215 Berne’s no-formality rule stems from practical problems.216 Today, 
there seems to be a new practical concern: we do not want each country reinsti-
tuting its own peculiar formality system for which compliance would be neces-
sary to get international protection.217 If the United States reinstitutes formali-
ties, such action may embolden and enable other countries to enact their own 
formalities, and U.S. authors would be disadvantaged if they did not comply.218 
 211. Gibson, supra note 31, at 218-19 (“Copyright law thus operates under the 
assumption that the author wishes to disseminate his or her work to the public for 
a fee, and that the only thing standing in the way is the threat of unauthorized 
(i.e., uncompensated) copying. When the opposite is true—when the goal is 
privacy, not profits—copyright often gets it wrong. Because copyright law assumes 
that authors’ desire for control derives from their desire to market their works, 
courts presume an irreparable injury whenever infringement takes place. This 
makes it remarkably easy for a copyright owner to secure an injunction, a prior 
restraint on speech that would be exceedingly difficult to get outside the copyright 
context.”). 
 212. Id. at 217-18. 
 213. See Jane C. Ginsburg, “With Untired Spirits and Formal Constancy”: Berne 
Compatibility of Formal Declaratory Measures to Enhance Copyright Title-Searching, 
28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1589 (2013). 
 214. SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND 
ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986, at 202-03 (1987). 
 215. Id. at 201. 
 216. Sprigman, supra note 33, at 545. 
 217. Id. at 544. 
 218. See Perlmutter, supra note 92, at 585 (“If the United States continues to impose 
formalities on the effective enforcement of rights, even if the formalities are 
technically Berne-compatible, other countries may choose to do so as well. The 
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A growing chorus, though, argues that the Berne Convention should not 
stop us from having a conversation about formalities.219 Scholars are calling for 
thoughtful application of formalities,220 industry actors seem open to reinstitut-
ing carefully calibrated formalities,221 and international governments are search-
ing for solutions to notice failure externalities.222 And even those who are gen-
erally skeptical of a return to formalities do recognize the benefits of public 
claiming.223 
Ultimately, this is a problem for Congress to fix.224 It has tried and failed,225 
but it is time for Congress to try again. In 2005, Congress commissioned the 
Copyright Office to conduct a study of the orphan works problem and to pub-
lish a report.226 The report recommended that Congress enact legislation to lim-
it the remedies for copyright infringement against a user if the user performed a 
“reasonably diligent search” for the owner prior to using the work.227 
Congress introduced bills in line with the recommendation of the Copy-
right Office. In 2006 and 2008, Congress put forth similar bills that would have 
consequence could be a bewildering welter of formalities, all of which must be 
ascertained and complied with in order to obtain remedies in different countries 
of exploitation.”). 
 219. See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 179, at 1518; Pamela Samuelson, Preliminary Thoughts 
on Copyright Reform, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 551, 570 (2007). 
 220. PATRY, supra note 141, at 208 (“In order for copyright to function effectively, some 
measure of formalities must be imposed.”). 
 221. Mike Masnick, Did The RIAA Really Just Come Out In Support Of ‘Opt-In’ 
Copyright? [Updated], TECHDIRT (Oct. 15, 2010, 1:53 PM), https://www.techdirt 
.com/articles/20101015/13051411452/did-the-riaa-just-come-out-in-support-of-opt-
in-copyright.shtml. 
 222. See NEW RENAISSANCE, REPORT OF THE ‘COMITÉ DES SAGES’ REFLECTION GROUP ON 
BRINGING EUROPE’S CULTURAL HERITAGE ONLINE (2011). 
 223. Ginsburg, supra note 193, at 342 (“Notice, registration and recordation of transfers 
thus are unquestionably beneficial and desirable; the problem, and the historical 
difference between the United States and much of the rest of the world, lies in the 
consequences of failure to affix notice, register, or record a transfer of 
ownership.”). 
 224. ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION, supra note 44, at 2 (“[W]ith so many 
equities at stake, the complexity and breadth of the issues make them well suited 
for legislative action.”); Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 677 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting “the establishment of a mechanism for exploiting 
unclaimed books is a matter more suited for Congress than this Court”). 
 225. See Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008, S. 2913, 110th Cong. (2008); 
Orphan Works Act of 2008, H.R. 5889, 110th Cong. (2008); Orphan Works Act of 
2006, H.R. 5439, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 226. Orphan Works, 70 Fed. Reg. 3,739, 3,741 (Jan. 26, 2005). 
 227. 2006 REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 46, at 41. 
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limited remedies against reasonably diligent searchers.228 The 2008 Shawn Bent-
ley Orphan Works Act would have limited remedies where the infringer had 
performed and documented a good faith, diligent search for the copyright hold-
er before using the work.229 The use of the work must have provided attribution 
to the copyright holder, if known.230 And the infringing user must also have in-
cluded an appropriate symbol or notice in association with any public distribu-
tion, display, or performance of the work.231 Neither Congress was successful in 
enacting the proposed legislation. These proposals drew scholarly criticism be-
cause the term “reasonably diligent search” was left undefined and was open to 
judicial interpretation.232 
The Copyright Office has been studying the orphan works problem for the 
past decade.233 The Copyright Office’s 2015 report again recommended limiting 
user liability only for those who can document a good faith diligent search.234 
But diligent searching favors commercial over non-commercial users.235 Paying 
for a search plus reasonable compensation may be too costly for large-scale us-
ers of orphan works, like the mass digitizing projects.236 It may also be too costly 
for all but well-capitalized commercial creators.237 A diligent search also favors 
 228. H.R. 5439, 109th Cong. (2006); Orphan Works Act of 2008, H.R. 5889, 110th Cong. 
(2008); see also Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008, S. 2913, 110th Cong. 
(2008). 
 229. Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008, S. 2913, 110th Cong., at § 2(a) (2008) 
(amending 17 U.S.C. § 514(b)(1) & (2)); 154 CONG. REC. S9867-68 (daily ed. Sept. 
26, 2008). 
 230. S. 2913 sec. 2, § 514(b)(1)(A)(ii). 
 231. Id. § 514(b)(1)(A)(iii). 
 232. See, e.g., Feliú, supra note 159, at 120; Laura N. Bradrick, Note, Copyright—Don’t 
Forget About the Orphans: A Look at a (Better) Legislative Solution to the Orphan 
Works Problem, 34 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 537, 539, 559, 565 (2012). 
 233. See Orphan Works, 70 Fed. Reg. 3,739, 3,741 (Jan. 26, 2005); ORPHAN WORKS AND 
MASS DIGITIZATION, supra note 44.  
 234. ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION, supra note 44, at 56-57 (“A diligent 
search requirement is necessary both to offset the limitations on infringement 
remedies that would otherwise apply, and to facilitate wherever possible the 
would-be user locating and working with the owner.”). 
 235. Walker, supra note 158, at 987. 
 236. Id. at 1000. 
 237. See, e.g., Comments of the Library Copyright Alliance In Response to the 
Copyright Office’s Notice of Inquiry Concerning Orphan Works and Mass 
Digitization 8 (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/noi 
_10222012/Library-Copyright-Alliance.pdf (“[A]ny legislative approach that 
involves licensing, such as extended collective licensing, is completely 
unacceptable to the library community. It would be enormously costly to users, 
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well-funded projects over non-profit activities. This in turn creates a barrier to 
entry for individual and non-profit users and a de facto cartel for commercial 
users.238 Rather than placing the burden on the user, a copyright holder should 
shoulder some responsibility to claim her work. 
I therefore propose that a copyright holder should claim an interest in her 
original work of authorship. Specifically, a copyright holder should register a 
claim of interest for her work and affix a notice of the claim to the work. Today, 
copyrights come into existence without any formalities, and my proposal would 
not change this. My proposed public claiming would not be constitutive; copy-
right would still attach at the moment of fixation. And failure to comply would 
not divest copyright. But if a copyright holder wanted to seek certain remedies 
against a user, she would need to claim her work. If a copyright holder failed to 
register and failed to publicly claim her work (where appropriate),239 a user 
could mount a successful innocent infringer defense. 
An author would have the right to claim her copyright any time during the 
term of protection. But if a copyright holder failed to claim her work, a user of 
the work would be allowed to raise an “innocent infringer defense.” Essentially, 
a copyright holder would need to opt-in and publicly claim her work to defeat 
the innocent infringer defense. Perfecting registration and notice would fore-
close future users’ resort to the innocent infringer defense. This is similar to the 
current requirement that a work be registered to be eligible for statutory dam-
ages and attorneys’ fees. But these current statutory incentives alone are not suf-
ficient to curb the orphan works problem discussed above. My proposal offers 
added protection to users. 
Users shy away from orphan works in part because of the liability they face. 
Copyright liability arises even if the user reasonably, but erroneously, thought a 
work was in the public domain.240 Today, ignorance of the copyright status of a 
work is irrelevant. For copyright liability, it does not matter if the work fails to 
bear a copyright notice or is unregistered—but these factors can influence the 
assessment of damages.241 Reinvigorating an innocent infringer defense makes 
and little if any of the fees collected would ever actually reach the copyright owners 
of the orphan works.”). 
 238. Walker, supra note 158, at 1002. 
 239. It is hard to put a notice on some works, such as live music. See Gibson, supra note 
31, at 226 (“[I]t would be difficult to ‘affix’ a notice to a live musical performance. 
The same might be said for digitally streamed audio, although the more high-tech 
the distribution method the more likely that some effective form of notice could 
be coded into the software and hardware.”). 
 240. ALAN LATMAN & WILLIAM S. TAGER, 86TH CONG., LIABILITY OF INNOCENT 
INFRINGERS OF COPYRIGHTS, STUDY NO. 25, at 135, 144 (Comm. Print 1958), 
http://copyright.gov/history/studies/study25.pdf. 
 241. Infringers are liable either for actual damages and profits or, if the work was 
registered at the time of infringement, statutory damages ranging from $750 to 
$30,000 per act of infringement (and up to $150,000 per infringement if the 
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sense precisely because strict liability no longer makes sense. Liability, when a 
copyright holder has not claimed her work, is unreasonable. 
Under my proposal, a copyright holder would be encouraged to publicly 
claim her work. To do so she would minimally include her name,242 the claim of 
an exclusive right,243 and the date of creation244 in a place readily visible to give 
reasonable notice of the claim of copyright. An author’s name on the work, 
while not always perfect information, is a good starting point for finding the 
current copyright holder.245 If the author named on the work is no longer the 
current copyright holder, a user could locate the current holder by consulting 
the registry.246 For this reason, the registry should be current and user-
friendly.247 The practical effect of omitting a copyright claim altogether, as the 
Copyright Office acknowledges, is that “often a search for the owner of copy-
right in the work is dead in its tracks as soon as it has begun.”248 My proposal 
couples public claiming on the work, with public claiming in a registry. 
copyright owner proves the infringement was willful), “as the court considers 
just.” 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2012). 
 242. Or pseudonym if there are privacy concerns. 
 243. This would include “Copyright,” the abbreviation “Copr.,” the letter “C” enclosed 
in a circle, “All rights reserved,” “Derechos reservados,” or comparable language.  
 244. The date of creation gives a potential user a starting point for evaluating the term 
of protection. The date of creation is relevant for calculating the term of 
protection for corporate works and works for hire. It is also helpful in evaluating 
the duration of copyright for an individual because it helps bracket the time 
during which the author lived.  
 245. Ginsburg, supra note 193, at 344 (observing “the author’s name should normally 
furnish the best starting point for ascertaining copyright ownership”). 
 246. Thus, even if the author is not the current copyright holder, she can often help 
point a user in the right direction. Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA 
L. REV. 1, 47 n.214 (2010) (“In a world of media conglomerates who purchase each 
other’s divisions, spin off product lines, and liquidate in bankruptcy at a dizzying 
rate, an author is now far easier to track down than her assorted assignees, their 
successors, and their respective assignees. It also seems more likely that an author 
will have kept track of what publisher bought her publisher than that a publisher 
will know how to find all of the authors whose contracts it assumed when it 
purchased the company that purchased the company that initially held the 
authors’ contracts.”). 
 247. See Ginsburg, supra note 193, at 346. Technology can be harnessed to create a user-
friendly registry and help copyright holders affix notice to their works, like with 
metadata. See, e.g., Elkin-Koren, supra note 136, at 1540; Hansen et al., supra note 
132, at 51. While the registry could be operated by a private entity, private registry 
fragmentation could be a problem. Fragmented private registries are an 
inadequate solution to the search cost problem. Regardless of whether a public or 
private entity operates the registry, its utility is undermined if it is not current and 
easy to use. 
 248. 2006 REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 46, at 23. 
460 
 
Reid FINAL COPY.docx (Do Not Delete) 7/7/2016 3:29 PM 
CLAIMING THE COPYRIGHT  
There are a couple different options to encourage up-to-date registry in-
formation.249 If the copyright holder transferred her interests, either through an 
inter vivos assignment or testamentary devise, her successors would need to up-
date the registry. Failure to do so would allow a user to assert the innocent in-
fringer defense. A defect in the registration could be cured at any time. But 
while the registration was defective, a user could assert the defense.250 In addi-
tion, we could require that any assignment of a copyright be recorded to be val-
id against subsequent transferees. Or we could prohibit an assignee from bring-
ing an action for infringement until the assignment is recorded and the 
registration is updated. And lastly we could require updating the registry and 
recording the assignment or else the copyright would revert to the grantor.251 
Regardless of the specific approach used, a formality requiring transfers of cop-
yright to be timely recorded would comply with our obligations under the 
Berne Convention, as discussed further below.252 
In addition to encouraging public claiming and the use of unclaimed 
works, I propose adding an innocent infringer defense to the defenses a user can 
raise. This defense would not replace the fair use defense.253 Today, the fair use 
defense offers some protection for users, but it is often unpredictable.254 Courts 
are far from consistent in their fair use outcomes.255 And the Copyright Office is 
 249. Like with domain name registries, the copyright registry should be easy to update. 
See IDRP FAQs for Domain Name Registrants, INTERNET CORP. FOR ASSIGNED 
NAMES & NUMBERS (ICANN), http://www.icann.org/en/resources/registrars/ 
consensus-policies/wdrp/faqs (requiring “domain name registrants to review the 
contact information associated with their domain names and make corrections 
when necessary”). 
 250. Accord Gervais & Renaud, supra note 11, at 1480 (agreeing with CPP proposal that 
copyright holders should be obliged to update the registry with information of 
assignments or death of the author, with failure to do so resulting in loss of 
registration benefits). 
 251. Cf. Ginsburg, supra note 193, at 345-46 (“Congress could provide a more radical 
solution to incentivize recordation: any exclusive rights that are transferred but 
not recorded within a stated period will revert to their grantors.”). 
 252. See Ginsburg, supra note 213, at 1621 (“The principal measure this Article proposes, 
conditioning validity of transfer of copyright on recordation of a note or 
memorandum of the transfer, is Berne-compatible because, while Berne protects 
the interests of successors in title, it does not regulate the means by which one 
becomes a successor in title.”); Ginsburg, supra note 193, at 345 (suggesting “a 
filing obligation that addresses who owns a copyright, rather than whether a 
copyright exists or may be enforced is not a prohibited ‘formality’ in the sense of 
that treaty”).  
 253. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (codifying four fair use factors). 
 254. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 180, at 187; Litman, supra note 133, at 596.  
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unable to provide legal advice to individuals with specific questions about fair 
use.256 Risk-averse users are often reluctant to rely on the unpredictable affirma-
tive defense of fair use.257 As a result, copyright today chills more than just un-
reasonable uses of works. Copyright chills fair uses as well.258 
The innocent infringer defense would insulate an individual user of the 
work without divesting or invalidating the copyright in the work. The term “in-
nocent infringer”259 applies to a user of a work who cannot reasonably deter-
mine the copyright status of the work or from whom to seek permission. For 
works that are without a copyright claim or a current registration, the user 
would be “innocent.” As with the fair use defense, a user would carry the bur-
den of proof on the innocent infringer defense. The user would have the burden 
to show either that the authorized copy of the work she used did not bear a 
copyright claim, or that the copyright registry information was not current at 
the time of use.260 As noted above, the copyright holder would retain the au-
 255. But transformative uses tend to fare better in the fair use analysis. Neil Weinstock 
Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715, 742 (2011) (“There 
is certainly a strikingly high—though less than universal—correlation between 
judicial findings regarding transformativeness and fair use outcomes.”). 
 256. See 37 C.F.R. § 201.2(a)(3) (2015) (“The Copyright Office, however, does not give 
specific legal advice on the rights of persons, whether in connection with 
particular uses of copyrighted works, cases of alleged foreign or domestic 
copyright infringement, contracts between authors and publishers, or other 
matters of a similar nature.”). 
 257. See, e.g., Steven D. Jamar, Crafting Copyright Law to Encourage and Protect User-
Generated Content in the Internet Social Networking Context, 19 WIDENER L.J. 843, 
870 (2010) (noting the problem with relying on fair use is the “after-the-fact 
determination of fair use, the uncertain application of it to many particular 
situations, plus the costs of defense if sued even where the defense would be 
upheld”). 
 258. See Thomas F. Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright Overenforcement, 93 IOWA L. REV. 
1271, 1288-91 (2008) (presenting a model of the private costs and benefits faced by 
would-be users of copyrighted materials and suggesting that would-be users are 
often deterred from engaging in conduct that likely falls within the ambit of fair 
use). 
 259. I acknowledge that the term “innocent” user does not connote a homogenous 
category, and therefore have further defined the term above the line. See LATMAN & 
TAGER, supra note 240, at 139. 
 260. If a work bears a copyright claim, and a search of the copyright registry reveals an 
author who is no longer alive or no longer the current holder, a user of that work 
should be empowered to assert an innocent infringer defense. I believe it is the 
responsibility of the author’s heirs or assigns to update the copyright registry. 
Failure to update the registry should authorize a user to assert an innocent 
infringer defense.  
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thority to prospectively claim the work, or to update the registry.261 Once an 
omission was cured and the work is publicly claimed, a copyright holder would 
be able to enforce the copyright against future users, who could not invoke the 
defense. 
Under my proposal, the innocent infringer defense has three components. 
First, a user would be insulated from statutory damages and attorneys’ fees. 
Second, as a measure of damages, a court would be empowered to assess an 
amount equivalent to a fair and reasonable license fee. And third, a court would 
have discretion to issue an injunction on the condition that the copyright hold-
er reimburses the innocent infringer’s reasonable outlay of expenses. Actual 
damages would remain available for all copyrighted works. 
This innocent infringer defense would ameliorate the chilling effect and 
risks associated with using unclaimed works. The first element of my proposal 
is that statutory damages and attorneys’ fees would not be available against an 
innocent infringer.262 A copyright holder should be entitled to recover provable 
actual damages,263 but an innocent infringer should not face statutory damages 
or attorneys’ fees. The presumption of harm for statutory damages is inapposite 
when faced with a user who is without notice of the copyright status and a cop-
yright holder who has not publicly claimed her work. Additionally, the party 
alleging damages should bear the burden of proof. Here, the author is the least 
cost avoider and should bear the risk of loss. Requiring the least cost avoider to 
bear the burden of proof of harm fosters creative use of works, whereas the cur-
rent presumption of harm and availability of statutory damages chill creative 
expression.264 
The second dimension of the defense would authorize a reasonable license 
fee for use of the work. As a measure of damages, a court would be empowered 
to assess an amount equivalent to a fair and reasonable license fee. If at the time 
of the infringement, the work was unclaimed, a copyright holder’s remedy 
could be limited to a fair and reasonable license fee, or no fee at all. The court 
could set the license fee on a case-by-case basis. Alternatively, guidelines could 
 261. I acknowledge that in some instances curative efforts may be easier for the registry 
than for notice on the work. See, e.g., Charles Garnier, Paris v. Andin Int’l, Inc., 36 
F.3d 1214, 1226-27 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding copyright holder’s curative efforts 
insufficient when it did not add notice to all copies). 
 262. These remedies are already unavailable if the copyright holder failed to register her 
work before the infringement began. 
 263. Admittedly, actual damages are hard to prove. See, e.g., Kent Sinclair, Jr., 
Comment, Liability for Copyright Infringement—Handling Innocence in a Strict-
Liability Context, 58 CAL. L. REV. 940, 964, 974 (1970). 
 264. See, e.g., Ryan Andrews, Note, Contracting Out of the Orphan Works Problem: How 
the Google Book Search Settlement Serves As A Private Solution to the Orphan Works 
Problem and Why It Should Matter to Policy Makers, 19 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 97, 
98 (2009) (“The prospect of either high money damages or an injunction deters 
would-be users of orphan works from making productive use of them.”). 
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set out reasonable license fees for different categories of works, and perhaps dif-
ferent categories of users, by either the Copyright Office or by a private collec-
tive rights organization. Regardless of who determines the license fee for un-
claimed works, it should be a modest amount.265 Works that are economically 
successful are unlikely to be unclaimed.266 If the copyright holder wants more 
than modest license fee, she is incented to claim and register the work. 
The third facet of the defense provides for injunctive relief, for which an 
innocent infringer could seek reimbursement from the copyright holder for her 
reasonable outlay of expenses.267 A copyright holder could seek injunctive relief 
against an innocent infringer. But the court, in its discretion, could condition 
the grant of injunctive relief on the copyright holder reimbursing the infringer’s 
reasonable costs associated with the use. If the user incurred substantial ex-
penditures in connection with the production or performance of the copyright-
ed work, the court could award the copyright holder only a reasonable license 
fee, rather than injunctive relief.268 This proposal balances concerns about copy-
right trolls and interests of authors whose works are appropriated by commer-
cial entities. 
Offering courts discretion to balance the concerns of authors and users is 
nothing new. It was once thought that the discretion of the courts to assess 
damages was sufficient to insulate innocent infringers.269 It was thought that 
affording courts flexibility in granting remedies, rather than crafting a single 
legislative shield for an infinite variety of factual situations, would better solve 
the problems raised by innocent infringement. Unfortunately, history shows 
that this remedial discretion alone has been insufficient to forestall the prob-
lems of notice failure. My proposal offers more robust protection for users of 
unclaimed works, without divesting and invalidating the copyright. A copyright 
holder could claim her work at any time, and then a copyright holder’s full 
panoply of rights and remedies would be available. 
There are a number of advantages that flow from this proposal for new-
style formalities,270 which does not condition copyright protection on registra-
 265. Randal C. Picker, Private Digital Libraries and Orphan Works, 27 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1259, 1283 (2012) (“We should expect royalty rates for orphan use to be 
modest.”). 
 266. Id. at 1261. 
 267. Cf. Gervais & Renaud, supra note 11, at 1474 (“Injunctive relief could be limited as a 
matter of equity in cases where a rights holder has failed to communicate to the 
public that her work is protected when circumstances do not adequately explain or 
excuse the omission.”). 
 268. In such instances, the copyright holder would not be entitled to injunctive relief 
and would be eligible only for a reasonable license fee. 
 269. LATMAN & TAGER, supra note 240, at 156. 
 270. See Gervais & Renaud, supra note 11, at 1479 (“[A] relaxed notice requirement 
might conceivably be reconciled with Berne if it can be characterized as something 
other than a formality.”); Sprigman, supra note 33, at 556 (“Although there are 
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tion, reduces the consequences of infringement for unclaimed works, and yet 
still allows for redress for the infringement of unclaimed works. In practical 
terms, my proposal shifts the burden to copyright holders of unclaimed works. 
Major publishers and distributors of original works of authorship already claim 
their works. Open any bestselling book, watch the credits in any major motion 
picture, and review the jacket on any popular music album, and you will see a 
copyright notice claiming an interest in the work. Although operating in for-
mality-optional systems, foreign and domestic purveyors of copyrighted mate-
rials often opt to publicly claim their works.271 These copyright holders claim, 
not because the law requires them to, but because it is in their economic inter-
est. Copyright holders of commercially-valuable works recognize the benefits of 
claiming. My proposal would have little effect on these entities. The major 
thrust of my proposal is felt on orphan works. 
Unlike prior legislative attempts at a solution to orphan works, I would not 
put a double burden on the user. A user should not have to bear the cost of a 
reasonably diligent search and the cost of a reasonable license fee. The Copy-
right Office recommended that Congress limit remedies as a way to manage the 
orphan works problem.272 But this proposed limit on remedies would be only 
for users who can document a “reasonably diligent search”273—a vague term. 
Searches can be hard and expensive,274 and the prospect of a search can be 
enough to dissuade use of the work.275 Users who have engaged in such searches 
report that they are onerous and cost prohibitive.276 
The burden of proving a reasonably diligent search is too high to put on a 
user when the copyright holder did not publicly claim her work. Reasonably 
diligent searching favors large, commercial entities over non-profit and indi-
arguments both ways, I believe that the better reading of Berne would permit new-
style formalities,” which are “voluntary formalities backed with default licenses.”). 
 271. Cf. Sorkin, supra note 34, at 592 (“[A]lthough European copyright laws are largely 
formality-free, businesses involved with copyright use systems of registration and 
recordation [] somewhat similar to those found in the United States.”). 
 272. See ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION, supra note 44, at 1; 2006 REPORT ON 
ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 46, at 115-21. 
 273. 2006 REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 46, at 107. 
 274. Id. at 32 (“[C]onducting searches can prove to be costly, time-consuming 
endeavors. The comments are littered with examples of situations where the trail 
ran cold, turned into a dead end, or simply involved more time and money than 
the user was willing to spend.”). 
 275. Id. (“The mere perception that a search will become long and arduous is itself 
enough to thwart some potential uses” because, for example, “in academic, 
scholarly, and other non-commercial uses, any search costs immediately outweigh 
the expected monetary return of the use.”). 
 276. See Hansen et al., supra note 132, at 38 (“Library organizations have criticized the 
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vidual users.277 Rather than putting the onus on the user, my proposal puts the 
onus on the copyright holder to claim her work. The cost of searching for a 
copyright holder can be prohibitive, especially when added to the cost of nego-
tiating a fee once the holder is located.278 Rather than layering these costs on top 
of a subjective, case-by-case inquiry into the reasonableness and diligence of 
each search, my proposal would protect users when the work is unclaimed. Re-
quiring a reasonably diligent search does not meaningfully resolve the orphan 
works problem. My proposal offers an objective standard for determining when 
liability protection applies. 
Using an objective criterion for an innocent infringer defense leads to more 
predictability. My proposal would facilitate use of unclaimed works by reducing 
the risk of using these works. And if orphan works can be used with limited 
risk, then the problem of unknown owners is largely solved.279 Today, owner-
ship uncertainty plus the high risks and costs cause users to avoid unclaimed 
works.280 A reasonably diligent search standard does not ameliorate this. The 
uncertainty of assessing ex ante whether one’s search is reasonably diligent risks 
producing the same chilling avoidance of unclaimed work that we see in the 
current system. Users will remain unsure if they are shielded from liability. 
Under my proposal, the risk exposure for users of unclaimed works is low. 
Statutory damages and attorneys’ fees would be unavailable, injunctive relief 
could involve reimbursement of a user’s reasonable outlay, and a plaintiff likely 
would be limited to a modest license fee, if any. And for these reasons, there is 
greater incentive to privately negotiate rather than litigate a copyright infringe-
ment case for an unclaimed work. 
Claiming also helps to filter valuable works from the dark matter of copy-
right.281 Claiming is a rough proxy for financially-motivated authors.282 My 
 277. See Walker, supra note 158, at 986-87. 
 278. See Letter from Tim Brooks to Jule L. Sigall, supra note 156, at 2 (“[I]t is no 
exaggeration to say that there has been a chilling effect on the production of public 
domain reissues because it is prohibitively difficult to establish what is or is not in 
the public domain”). 
 279. See Sage, supra note 54, at 299 (“From a social wealth-maximization viewpoint, the 
unavailability [of copyright holders] would not be problematic if the potential 
licensees proceeded to use the orphaned works without permission.”); Valkonen & 
White, supra note 144, at 399 (“[O]n the access-cost side, the elimination of the 
barriers to use of orphan works can have a substantial output-enhancing 
impact.”). 
 280. ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION, supra note 44, at 2 (“While some users 
certainly may have viable defenses on fair use or other grounds, many will choose 
to forego use of the work entirely rather than risk the prospect of expensive 
litigation.”). 
 281. See, e.g., Samuelson et al., supra note 37, at 1200-01 (“Registration, by contrast, 
would signal to the world that copyright incentives are important to the owner of 
rights in a particular work and would help potential reusers and follow-on 
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proposal facilitates access to and use of works that the copyright holder did not 
bother to claim. The failure to claim a work signals that the work is of small 
enough value to the copyright holder that a reasonable license would be an ap-
propriate compensation. For orphan works, a reasonable license would facilitate 
the economic interests of the copyright holders, because otherwise the works 
are not exploited. A reasonable license is better than nothing. And if the copy-
right holder disagrees, she is incented to claim her work. In other words, if the 
copyright holder wanted more than a reasonable license fee, then she would be 
encouraged to claim the work. 
This proposal preserves a copyright holder’s ability to choose between 
property rules and liability rules.283 A copyright holder would decide whether to 
publicly claim the work or not. Generally, applying a liability rule, rather than a 
property rule, to unclaimed works would encourage more use of the works.284 
But rather than categorically shift from a property rule to a liability rule, like a 
compulsory license scheme would do, under my proposal an author could opt 
out of the liability rule by claiming her work. My proposal would give control to 
the copyright holder. If the copyright holder finds a reasonable license accepta-
ble, she can do nothing. But if she wants greater rents, she is empowered to 
claim the work and get full property rule protections. 
This proposal also complies with our international obligations under the 
Berne Convention.285 The Berne Convention prohibits formalities that pre-
condition the existence or exercise of copyright. While the Berne Convention 
creators to locate the person who owns the rights and possibly the conditions 
under which licenses might be available.”). 
 282. Oliar et al., supra note 1, at 2241 (“What the copyright system does, however, is 
mainly provide a market entitlement to creators that would allow them to exclude 
non-payers from accessing their works, and thus enhances financially motivated 
creators’ ability to appropriate the returns. Financially motivated creators are 
expected to use the copyright system if the additional benefits that it secures to 
them above and beyond all other background incentives outweighs their private 
cost of using it. Registration records thus likely provide a proxy for the types of 
creators who, and works that, benefit the most financially from the copyright 
system.”). 
 283. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability 
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
 284. See Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern 
Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 785 (2007); Christopher Jon Sprigman, Berne’s 
Vanishing Ban on Formalities, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1565, 1568 (2013). 
 285. See Gervais & Renaud, supra note 11, at 1479-80 (“By aiming only to reduce the 
consequences of infringement for unregistered works, and not conditioning 
copyright protection on registration, this proposal could be reconciled with Berne, 
provided that the creators of unregistered works are not deprived of the 
‘enjoyment and exercise’ of their rights. Provisions allowing some redress for the 
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prohibits copyright-specific formalities, it does not prohibit formalities like 
rules of procedure or evidence.286 Nor does it prohibit assessing fines for failing 
to deposit a copy of a work with the Copyright Office.287 The Berne Convention 
also accepts that transfers of a copyright interest must be in writing.288 Thus the 
Berne Convention accepts some formalities. Here, my proposal to require a 
copyright holder to claim her work, lest the work become orphaned, would not 
run afoul of Berne’s prohibition on formalities.289 Public claiming is not a pre-
condition on the copyright. 
Moreover, my proposal to retain the availability of actual damages and in-
junctive relief is important in the Berne analysis.290 The alternative—to categor-
ically eliminate actual damages or injunctive relief—would undermine the spir-
it, if not the letter of the no-formality rule.291 But conditioning certain remedies, 
like statutory damages and attorneys’ fees, on formalities, as we do now, com-
 286. See SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND 
NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND 325-26 (2d ed. 
2006). 
 287. Ginsburg, supra note 193, at 317 (“Berne does not prevent member States from 
requiring authors to subsidize a member State’s national library by in effect taxing 
the local publication of foreign authors’ works; thus, a member State may demand 
deposit and may impose fines for failure to comply, so long as any sanctions do 
not compromise the existence or enforceability of the copyright.”). 
 288. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2012); Berne Convention, art. 2(6). See also Gervais & Renaud, 
supra note 11, at 1472-73 (noting that the condition that a transfer be in writing is 
“Berne-permissible”). 
 289. See Response by the Carnegie Mellon Univ. Libraries to the Notice of Inquiry 
Concerning Orphan Works, Comment OW0537, at 2 (Mar. 22, 2005), http://www 
.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/OW0537-CarnegieMellon.pdf (“Like Stanford, 
Carnegie Mellon University Libraries does not believe that requiring copyright 
holders to file a notice with the Copyright Office to exclude a work from the 
designation of orphan status conflicts with the Berne Convention’s prohibition 
against formalities.”). 
 290. See Ginsburg, supra note 213, at 1593 (“Berne’s prohibition on formalities requires 
that the basic copyright remedies, such as injunctive relief and actual damages, 
remain available to foreign authors who have not locally registered their works or 
undertaken other locally-imposed declaratory measures.”). See also Gervais & 
Renaud, supra note 11, at 1474 (“While this [article 44.1 of the TRIPS Agreement] 
requires an injunctive remedy to be available in all cases (in the sense that the 
court must have the authority to impose it), it does not disallow the application of 
equitable considerations in particular cases.”). 
 291. Ginsburg, supra note 213, at 1599-600 (“We have posited that member states may 
not condition the basic remedy of injunctions (nor, for that matter, actual 
damages) on compliance with formalities because such a limitation would 
effectively eviscerate the no-formalities rule: a right cannot be ‘exercised’ if it 
cannot be enforced.”). 
468 
 
Reid FINAL COPY.docx (Do Not Delete) 7/7/2016 3:29 PM 
CLAIMING THE COPYRIGHT  
plies with the Berne Convention.292 I thus argue that my proposal does not vio-
late the Berne Convention. 
I acknowledge that reasonable minds may differ on my proposal’s compli-
ance with the Berne Convention. Scholars and policymakers have often differed 
on matters of Berne-compliance. For example, copyright scholars disagree on 
the permissibility of providing broader fair use protection for works that are not 
registered.293 And members of Congress, in the late 1980s disagreed about 
whether the formality requirement that a work be registered as a precondition 
to filing an infringement suit violated Berne.294 On balance, the concern about 





A copyright holder should claim her copyright. And if she does not, users 
should have some comfort in knowing they can use the work. Claiming is part 
 292. Id. at 1597-98 (“In general, the argument holds that remedies that exceed the 
protections mandated by international instruments are not subject to the Berne 
minima no-formalities rule. So long as the member state requires its own authors 
to comply with any declaratory obligations, then imposing the same obligations 
on foreign authors remains consistent with the rule of national treatment. Berne 
neither addresses nor, arguably, assumes availability of statutory damages and 
attorney’s fees; TRIPS includes these measures among its specified remedies, but it 
does not require member states to provide them. It might follow that conditioning 
the availability (to local and foreign authors alike) of these remedies on some act 
of public filing is both Berne- and TRIPS-compatible.”). But see id. at 1600 (“The 
Berne-plus remedies argument thus rests on a fundamental fallacy. Article 5(2) 
does not distinguish between traditional or basic remedies and additional, 
unusual, or new remedies: all remedies come within ‘the means of redress.’ Under 
this reading, there is no such thing as a Berne-plus remedy, and therefore no basis 
to impose formalities on the availability of some remedies but not others.”). 
 293. Compare Samuelson et al., supra note 37, at 1200 (proposing that “[u]nregistered 
works would still be protected by copyright law against exact or near-exact 
copying that would cause commercial harm, but fair uses might well be broader as 
to such works.”), with Ginsburg, supra note 213, at 1604 n.79 (concluding that the 
CPP “proposal violates Berne article 5(2) because it makes the scope of copyright 
dependent on registration: failure to comply with the registration formality means 
that the work will be subject to greater incursions on exclusive rights than 
registered works would be”). 
 294. Compare S. REP. No. 100-352, at 26 (1988) (“The committee concludes that the 
recordation requirement of section 205(d), at least as applied to foreign works 
originating in Berne countries, is incompatible with the Berne prohibition against 
formalities as preconditions for the ‘enjoyment and exercise’ of copyright.”), with 
H.R. REP. No. 100-609, at 43-44 (1988) (“The [pre-suit recordation requirement] is 
Berne compatible because the failure to record does not lead to loss of the 
copyright—it merely regulates who may sue.”). 
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of the copyright bargain. Public claiming signals ownership, filters out com-
mercially-dead works, and facilitates licensing. 
It is time to continue the conversation on how to thoughtfully reform cop-
yright for the modern digital age. As the current Register of Copyrights noted, 
“copyright law is over-stressed and requires some attention.”295 Modern copy-
right’s stress is exacerbated because of the policy choices to make public claim-
ing optional. Reform may face some practical hurdles, but that is no reason to 
mute the conversation on what type of reform would be desirable. 
Arguably Berne-compliant, my solution tips the balance and encourages 
use of unclaimed works until the copyright holder elects to publicly claim and 
register her work. Copyright holders would be forced to internalize the costs of 
notice failure. Between a user and the copyright holder, the copyright holder is 
the least cost avoider of the harms of inadequate claiming.296 A copyright holder 
can opt-in at any time and cure a prior omission of notice and registration. This 
proposal shifts the externalities of notice failure to the copyright holder, rather 
than to the public. Encouraging a copyright holder to claim her work improves 
the information in the copyright registry, decreases the transaction costs of 
finding copyright holders, promotes licensing of claimed works, reduces the 
risks associated with using unclaimed works, and functionally replenishes pub-
lic domain. 
Rather than eliminating formalities, which has created notice failure and 
unacceptable deadweight costs, perhaps a compromise could be reached. It is 
unclear why it must be all or nothing. Why must the law require onerous claim-
ing formalities or no claiming at all? Why must the law offer complete copy-
right protection or no protection at all? A compromise is appropriate here to 
balance the competing interests and the instrumental goals of copyright. The 
proposal outlined above balances these interests. 
Admittedly, my proposal is not a panacea that cures all that ails copyright. 
Claiming will not fix the clearance culture or prevent the doctrinal feedback 
loop that unnecessary licensing creates. Claiming does not resolve, ex ante, if 
non-literal copying is infringing. Claiming does not clarify the uncertainty in 
evaluating the substantial similarity of works. This proposal, while not a perfect 
solution, is a step in the right direction.297 The story of U.S. copyright formali-
ties is a story of adaptability and change. And we are ready for the next chapter 
in the story. 
 295. Maria A. Pallante, The Curious Case of Copyright Formalities, 28 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1415, 1415 (2013); see also Samuelson et al., supra note 37, at 1177 (“Copyright 
law is, for many reasons, under considerable stress today.”). 
 296. See LATMAN & TAGER, supra note 240, at 157 (observing that where notice is 
omitted, “the copyright owners is better equipped than the infringer to prevent the 
infringement”). 
 297. See PATRY, supra note 141, at 209 (“Reestablishing formalities is not a complete 
solution to the changes in the world of producing creative works, but it would at 
least significantly winnow down the number of problems.”). 
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